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We discuss recent developments in the literature that studies how the dynamics of earnings and wages
affect consumption choices over the life cycle. We start by analyzing the theoretical impact of income
changes on consumption - highlighting the role of persistence, information, size and insurability of
changes in economic resources. We next examine the empirical contributions, distinguishing between
papers that use only income data and those that use both income and consumption data. The latter
do this for two purposes. First, one can make explicit assumptions about the structure of credit and
insurance markets and identify the income process or the information set of the individuals. Second,
one can assume that the income process or the amount of information that consumers have are known
and tests the implications of the theory. In general there is an identification issue that is only recently
being addressed, with better data or better "experiments". We conclude with a discussion of the literature














The objective of this chapter is to discuss recent developments in the literature that studies how the
dynamics of earnings and wages a⁄ect consumption choices over the life cycle. Labor economists
and macroeconomists are the main contributors to this area of research. A theme of interest for
both labor economics and macroeconomics is to understand how much risk households face, to what
extent risk a⁄ects basic household choices such as consumption, labor supply and human capital
investments, and what types of risks matter for explaining behavior.1 These are questions that
have a long history in economics.
A fruitful distinction is between ex-ante and ex-post household responses to risk. Ex-ante
responses answer the question: "What do people do in the anticipation of shocks to their economic
resources?". Ex-post responses answer the question: "What do people do when they are actually hit
by shocks to their economic resources?". A classical example of ex-ante response is precautionary
saving induced by uncertainty about future household income (see Kimball, 1990, for a modern
theoretical treatment, and Carroll and Samwick, 1998, and Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese, 1992,
for empirical tests).2 An example of ex-post response is downward revision of consumption as a
result of a negative income shock (see Hall and Mishkin, 1982; Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante,
2007). More broadly, ex-ante responses to risk may include:3 (a) precautionary labor supply, i.e.,
1In this chapter we will be primarily interested in labor market risks. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that
households face other types of risks that may play an important role to understand behavior at di⁄erent points of
the life cycle. An example is mortality risk, which may be fairly negligible for working-age individuals but becomes
increasingly important for people past their retirement age. Another example is interest rate risk, which may in￿ uence
portfolio choice and optimal asset allocation decisions. In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in studying
the so-called "wealth e⁄ect", i.e., how shocks to the value of assets (primarily stocks and real estate) in￿ uence
consumption. Another branch of the literature has studied the interaction between interest rate risk and labor
market risk. Davis and Willen (2000) study if households use portfolio decisions optimally to hedge against labor
market risk.
2The precautionary motive for saving was also discussed in passing by Keynes (1936), and analyzed more formally
by Sandmo (1970), and Modigliani and Sterling (1983). Kimball (1990) shows that to generate a precautionary
motive for saving, individuals must have preferences characterized by prudence (convex marginal utility). Besley
(1995) and Carroll and Kimball (2005) discusses a case in which precautionary saving may emerge even for non-
prudent consumers facing binding liquidity constraints.
3We will use the terms "risk" and "uncertainty" interchangeably. In reality, there is a technical di⁄erence between
the two, dating back to Knight (1921). A risky event has an unknown outcome, but the underlying outcome distri-
bution is known (a "known unknown"). An uncertain event also involves an unknown outcome, but the underlying
distribution is unknown as well (an "unknown unknown"). According to Knight, the di⁄erence between risk and
2cutting the consumption of leisure rather than the consumption of goods (Low, 2005) (b) delaying
the adjustment to the optimal stock of durable goods in models with ￿xed adjustment costs of the
(S,s) variety (Bertola, Guiso and Pistaferri, 2005); (c) shifting the optimal asset allocation towards
safer assets in asset pricing models with incomplete markets (Davis and Willen, 2000); (d) increasing
the amount of insurance against formally insurable events (such as a ￿re in the home) when the
risk of facing an independent, uninsurable event (such as a negative productivity shock) increases
(known as "background risk" e⁄ects, see Gollier and Pratt, 1996, for theory and Guiso, Jappelli
and Terlizzese, 1996, for an empirical test); (e) and various forms of income smoothing activities,
such as signing implicit contracts with employer that promise to keep wages constant in the face of
variable labor productivity (see Azariadis, 1975, and Baily, 1977, for a theoretical discussion and
Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi, 2005, for a recent test using matched employer-employee data),
or even making occupational or educational choices that are associated with less volatile earnings
pro￿les. Ex-post responses include: (a) running down assets or borrowing at high(er) cost (Sullivan,
2008); (b) selling durables (Browning and Crossley, 2003);4 (c) change (family) labor supply (at
the intensive and extensive margin), including changing investment in human capital of children
(Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos, 2008; Beegle et al., 2004; Ginja, 2010); (d) using family
networks, loans from friends, etc. (Hayashi, Altonji and Kotliko⁄, 1996; Angelucci et al, 2010); (e)
relocating or migrating (presumably for lack of local job opportunities) or changing job (presumably
because of increased ￿rm risk) (Blanchard and Katz, 1992); (f) applying for government-provided
insurance (see Gruber, 1997; Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999; Blundell and Pistaferri, 2003; Kniesner
and Ziliak, 2002); (g) using charities (Dehejia, DeLeire and Luttmer, 2007).
Ex-ante and ex-post responses are clearly governed by the same underlying preference para-
meters. The ex-post impact of an income shock on consumption is much attenuated if consumers
have access to sources of insurance (both self-insurance and outside insurance) allowing them to
uncertainty is akin to the di⁄erence between objective and subjective probability.
4Frictions may make this channel excessively costly, although in recent times e¢ ciency has increased due to the
positive e⁄ect exerted by the Internet revolution (i.e., selling items on e-bay).
3smooth intertemporally their marginal utility. Thus, the structure of the income process, including
the persistence and the volatility of shocks as well as the sources of risk underlie both the ex-ante
and the ex-post responses.
Understanding how much risk and what types of risks people face is important for a number
of reasons. First, the list of possible behavioral responses given above suggests that ￿ uctuations in
microeconomic uncertainty can generate important ￿ uctuations in aggregate savings, consumption,
and growth.5 The importance of risk and of its measurement, is well captured in the following
quote from Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999): ￿In order to ...quantify the impact of the
precautionary motive for savings on both the aggregate capital stock and the equilibrium interest
rate...analysts require a measure of the magnitude of microeconomic uncertainty, and how that
uncertainty evolves over the business cycle".
Another reason for caring about risk is for its policy implications. Most of the labor market
risks we will study (such as risk of unemployment, of becoming disabled, and generally of low
productivity on the job due to health, employer mismatch, etc.) have negative e⁄ects on people￿ s
welfare and hence there would in principle be a demand for insurance against them. However, these
risks are subject to important adverse selection and moral hazard issues. For example, individuals
who were fully insured against the event of unemployment would have little incentive to exert
e⁄ort on the job. Moreover, even if informational asymmetries could be overcome, enforcement of
insurance contracts would be at best limited. For these reasons, we typically do not observe the
emergence of a private market for insuring productivity or unemployment risks. As in many cases
of market failure, the burden of insuring individuals against these risks is taken on (at least in part)
by the government. A classical normative question is: How should government insurance programs
be optimally designed? The answer depends partly on the amount and characteristics of risks being
insured. To give an example, welfare reform that make admission into social insurance programs
more stringent (as heavily discussed in the Disability Insurance literature) reduce disincentives
5If risk is countercyclical, it may also provide an explanation for the equity premium puzzle, see Mankiw (1986).
4to work or apply when not eligible, but also curtails insurance to the truly eligible (Low and
Pistaferri, 2010). To be able to assess the importance of the latter problem is crucial to know how
much smoothing is achieved by individuals on their own and low large is disability risk. A broader
issue is whether the government should step in to provide insurance against "initial conditions",
such as the risk of being born to bad parents or that of growing up in bad neighborhoods.
Finally, knowing the impact of shocks on behavior also matters for the purposes of understanding
the likely e⁄ectiveness of stabilization or "stimulus" policies, another classical question in economics.
As we shall see, the modern theory of intertemporal consumption draws a sharp distinction between
income changes that are anticipated and those that are not (i.e., shocks); it also highlights that
consumption should respond more strongly to persistent shocks vis-￿-vis shocks that do not last
long. Hence, the standard model predicts that consumption may be a⁄ected immediately by the
announcement of persistent tax reforms to occur at some point in the future. Consumption will
not change at the time the reform is actually implemented because there are no news in a plan that
is implemented as expected. The model also predicts that consumption is substantially a⁄ected
by a surprise permanent tax reform that happens today. What allows people to disconnect their
consumption from the vagaries of their incomes is the ability to transfer resources across periods by
borrowing or putting money aside. Naturally, the possibility of liquidity constraints makes these
predictions much less sharp. For example, consumers that are liquidity constrained will not be
able to change their consumption at the time of the announcement of a permanent tax change, but
only at the time of the actual passing of the reform (this is sometimes termed excess sensitivity
of consumption to predicted income changes ). Moreover, even an unexpected tax reform that is
transitory in nature may have large consumption responses.
These are all ex-post response considerations. As far as ex-ante responses are concerned, uncer-
tainty about future income realizations or policy uncertainty itself will also impact consumption.
The response of consumers to an increase in risk is to reduce consumption - or increase savings.
5This opens up another path for stabilization policies. For example, if the policy objective is to
stimulate consumption, one way of achieving this would be to reduce the amount of risk that peo-
ple face (such as making ￿ring more costly to ￿rms, etc.) or credibly committing to policy stability.
All these issues are further complicated when viewed from a General Equilibrium perspective: a
usual example is that stabilization policies are accompanied by increases in future taxation, which
consumers may anticipate.
Knowing the stochastic structure of income has relevance besides its role for explaining con-
sumption ￿ uctuations, as important as they may be. Consider the rise in wage and earnings
inequality that has taken place in many economies over the last 30 years (especially in the US and
in the UK). This poses a number of questions: Does the rise in inequality translate into an increase
in the extent of risk that people face? There is much discussion in the press and policy circles
about the possibility that idiosyncratic risk has been increasing and that it has been progressively
shifted from ￿rms and governments onto workers (one oft-cited example is the move from de￿ned
bene￿t pensions, where ￿rms bear the risk of underperforming stock markets, to de￿ned contribu-
tion pensions, where workers do).6 This shift has happened despite the "great moderation" taking
place at the aggregate level. Another important issue to consider is whether the rise in inequality
is a permanent or a more temporary phenomenon, because a policy intervention aimed at reducing
the latter (such as income maintenance policies) di⁄ers radically from a policy intervention aimed
at reducing the former (training programs, etc.). A permanent rise in income inequality is a change
in the wage structure due to, for example, skill-biased technological change that increases perma-
nently the returns from observed (schooling) and unobserved (ability) skills. A transitory rise in
inequality is sometimes termed "wage instability".7
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We start o⁄ in Section 2 with a discussion of
6One example is the debate in the popular press on the so-called "great risk shift" (Hacker, 2006; The Economist,
2007).
7What may generate such an increase? Candidates include an increase in turnover rates, a decline in unionization
or controlled prices. Increased wage instability was ￿rst studied by Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1994), who challenge
the conventional view that the rise in inequality has been mainly permanent and show that up to half of the wage
inequality increase we observe in the US is due to a rise in the "transitory" component.
6what the theory predicts regarding the impact of changes in economic resources on consumption.
As we shall see, the theory distinguishes quite sharply between persistent and transient changes,
anticipated and unanticipated changes, insurable and uninsurable changes, and - if consumption is
subject to adjustment costs - between small and large changes.
Given the importance of the nature of income changes for predicting consumption behavior,
we then move in Section 3 on to reviewing the literature that has tried to come up with measures
of wage or earnings risk using univariate data on wages, earnings or income. The objective of
these papers has been that of identifying the most appropriate characterization of the income
process in a parsimonious way. We discuss the modeling procedure and the evidence supporting the
various models. Most papers make no distinction between unconditional and conditional variance
of shocks.8 Others assume that earnings are exogenous. More recent papers have relaxed both
assumptions. We discuss in this section also papers that have taken a more statistical path, while
retaining the exogeneity assumption, and modeled in various way the dynamics and heterogeneity of
risk faced by individuals. We later discuss papers that have explored the possibility of endogenizing
risk by including labor supply decisions, human capital (or health) investment decisions, or job-
to-job mobility decisions. We con￿ne this discussion to the end of the chapter (Section 5) because
this approach is considerably more challenging and in our view represents the most promising
development of the literature to date.
In Section 4 we discuss papers that use consumption and income data jointly. Our reading is
that they do so with two di⁄erent (and contrasting) objectives. Some papers assume that the life
cycle-permanent income hypothesis provides a correct description of consumer behavior and use
the extra information available to either identify the "correct" income process faced by individuals
(which is valuable given the di¢ culty to do so statistically using just income data) or identify the
amount of information people have about their future income changes. The idea is that even if
8The conditional variance is closer to the concept of risk emphasized by the theory (as in the Euler equation
framework, see Blanchard and Mankiw, 1988).
7the correct income process could be identi￿ed, there would be no guarantee that the estimated
"unexplained" variability in earnings represents "true" risk as seen from the individual standpoint
(the excess variability represented by measurement error being the most trivial example). Since
risk "is in the eye of the beholder", some researchers have noticed that consumption would re￿ ect
whatever amount of information (and, in the ￿rst case, whatever income process) people face.
We discuss papers that have taken the route of using consumption and income data to extract
information about risk faced (or perceived) by individuals, such as Blundell and Preston (1998),
Guvenen (2007), Guvenen and Smith (2009), Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2007), Cunha,
Heckman and Navarro (2005), and Primiceri and van Rens (2009). Other papers in this literature
use consumption and income data jointly in a more traditional way: They assume that the income
process is correct and that the individual has no better information than the econometrician and
proceed to test the empirical implications of the theory, i.e., how smooth is consumption relative to
income. Hall and Mishkin (1982) and Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) are two examples. In
general there is an identi￿cation issue: one cannot separately identify insurance and information.
We discuss two possible solutions proposed in the literature. First, identi￿cation of episodes in
which shocks are unanticipated and of known duration (i.e., unexpected transitory tax refunds or
other payments from the government, or weather shocks). If the assumptions about information
and duration hold, all that remains is "insurability". Second, the use of subjective expectations
to extract information about future income. These need to be combined with consumption and
realized income data to identify insurance and durability of shocks.9 The chapter concludes with a
discussion of future research directions in Section 6.
2 The Impact of Income Changes on Consumption: Some Theory
In this section we discuss what theory has to say regarding the impact of income changes on
consumption.
9Another possible solution is to envision using multiple response (consumption, labor supply, etc.), where the
information set is identical but insurability of shocks may di⁄er.
82.1 The Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis
To see how the degree of persistence of income shocks and the nature of income changes a⁄ects
consumption, consider a simple example in which income is the only source of uncertainty of the
model.10 Preferences are quadratic, consumers discount the future at rate
1￿￿
￿ and save on a single
risk-free asset with deterministic real return r, ￿ (1 + r) = 1 (this precludes saving due to returns
outweighing impatience), the horizon is ￿nite (the consumer dies with certainty at age A and has no
bequest motive for saving), and credit markets are perfect. As we shall see, quadratic preferences
are in some ways quite restrictive. Nevertheless, this simple characterization is very useful because
it provides the correct qualitative intuition for most of the e⁄ects of interest; this intuition carries
over with minor modi￿cations to the more sophisticated cases. In the quadratic preferences case,
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is an "annuity" parameter that
increases with age and ￿i;a;t is the consumer￿ s information set at age a. Despite its simplicity,
this expression is rich enough to identify three key issues regarding the response of consumption to
changes in the economic resources of the household.
First, consumption responds to news in the income process, but not to expected changes. Only
innovations to (current and future) income that arrive at age a (the term E (yi;a+j;t+jj￿i;a;t) ￿
E (yi;a+j;t+jj￿i;a￿1;t￿1)) have the potential to change consumption between age a ￿ 1 and age a.
Anticipated changes in income (for which there is no innovation) do not a⁄ect consumption. Assis-
tant Professors promoted in February may rent a larger apartment immediately, in the anticipation
of the higher salary starting in September. We will record an increase in consumption in February
(when the income change is announced), but not in September (when the income change actually
10The de￿nition of income used here includes earnings and transfers (public and private) received by all family
members. It excludes ￿nancial income.
9occurs). This is predicated on the assumption that consumers can transfer resources from the
future to the present by, e.g., borrowing. In the example above, a liquidity constrained Assistant
Professor will not change her (rent) consumption at the time of the announcement of a promotion,
but only at the time of the actual salary increase. With perfect credit markets, however, the model
predicts that anticipated changes do a⁄ect consumption when they are announced. In terms of
stabilization policies, this means that two types of income changes will a⁄ect consumption. First,
consumption may be a⁄ected immediately by the announcement of tax reforms to occur at some
point in the future. Consumption will not change at the time the reform is actually implemented.
Second, consumption may be a⁄ected by a surprise tax reform that happens today.
The second key issue emerging from equation (1) is that the life cycle horizon also plays an
important role (the term ￿a). A transitory innovation smoothed over 40 years has a smaller impact
on consumption than the same transitory innovation to be smoothed over 10 years. For example, if
one assumes that the income process is i.i.d., the marginal propensity to consume with respect to
an income change from (1) is simply ￿a. Assuming r = 0:02, the marginal propensity to consume
out of income shock increases from 0.04 (when A ￿ a = 40) to 0.17 (when A ￿ a = 5), and it is
1 in the last period of life. Intuitively, at the end of the life cycle transitory shocks would look,
e⁄ectively, like permanent shocks. With liquidity constraints, however, shocks may have similar
e⁄ects on consumption independently of the age at which they are received.
The last key feature of equation (1) is the persistence of innovations. More persistent innovations
have a larger impact than short-lived innovations. To give a more formal characterization of the
importance of persistence, suppose that income follows an ARMA(1,1) process:
yi;a;t = ￿yi;a￿1;t￿1 + "i;a;t + ￿"i;a￿1;t￿1 (2)





















= ￿(r;￿;￿;A ￿ a)"i;a;t
Table 2.1 below shows the value of the marginal propensity to consume ￿ for various com-
binations of ￿; ￿, and A ￿ a (setting r = 0:02). A number of facts emerge. If the income shock
represents an innovation to a random walk process (￿ = 1;￿ = 0), consumption responds one-to-one
to it regardless of the horizon (the response is attenuated only if shocks end after some period, say
L < A).11 A decrease in the persistence of the shock lowers the value of ￿. When ￿ = 0:8 (and
￿ = ￿0:2) for example, the value of ￿ is a modest 0.13. A decrease in the persistence of the MA
component acts in the same direction (but the magnitude of the response is much attenuated). In
this case as well, the presence of liquidity constraints may invalidate the sharp prediction of the
model. For example, more and less persistent shocks may have a similar e⁄ect on consumption.
When the consumer is hit by a short-lived negative shock, she can smooth the consumption re-
sponse over the entire horizon by borrowing today (and repaying in the future when income reverts
to the mean). If borrowing is precluded, a short-lived or long-lived shock have similar impacts on
consumption.
The income process (2) considered above is restrictive, because there is a single error component
which follows an ARMA(1,1) process. As we discuss in Section 3, a very popular characterization
in calibrated macroeconomic models is to assume that income is the sum of a random walk process
and a transitory i.i.d. component:
yi;a;t = pi;a;t + "i;a;t (3)
pi;a;t = pi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿i;a;t (4)
11This could be the case if y is labor income and L is retirement. However, if y is household income, it is implausible
to assume that shocks (permanent or transitory) end at retirement. Events like death of a spouse, ￿ uctuations in the
value of assets, intergenerational transfers towards children or relatives, etc., all conjure to create some income risk
even after formal retirement from the labor force.
11Table 1: The response of consumption to income shocks under quadratic preferences
￿ ￿ A ￿ a ￿
1 -0.2 40 0.81
1 0 10 1
0.99 -0.2 40 0.68
0.95 -0.2 40 0.39
0.8 -0.2 40 0.13
0.95 -0.2 30 0.45
0.95 -0.2 20 0.53
0.95 -0.2 10 0.65
0.95 -0.1 40 0.44
0.95 -0.01 40 0.48
1 0 1 1
0 -0.2 40 0.03
The appeal of this income process is that it is close to the notion of a Friedman￿ s permanent
income hypothesis income process.12 In this case, the response of consumption to the two types of
shocks is:
￿ci;a;t = ￿a"i;a;t + ￿i;a;t (5)
which shows that consumption responds one-to-one to permanent shocks but the response of
consumption to a transitory shock depends on the time horizon. For young consumers (with a long
time horizon), the response should be small. The response should increase as consumers age. Figure
1 plots the value of the response for a consumer who lives until age 75. Clearly, it is only in the
last 10 years of life or so that there is a substantial response of consumption to a transitory shock.
The graph also plots for the purpose of comparison the expected response in the in￿nite horizon
case. An interesting implication of this graph is that a transitory unanticipated stabilization policy
is likely to a⁄ect substantially only the behavior of older consumers (unless liquidity constraints
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Figure 1: The response of consumption to a transitory income shock.
are important - which may well be the case for younger consumers).13
Note ￿nally that if the permanent component were literally permanent (pi;a;t = pi), it would
a⁄ect the level of consumption but not its change (unless consumers were learning about pi, see
Guvenen, 2007).
In the classical version of the LC-PIH the size of income changes does not matter. One reason
why the size of income changes may matter is because of adjustment costs: Consumers tend to
smooth consumption and follow the theory when expected income changes are large, but are less
likely to do so when the changes are small and the cost of adjusting consumption are not trivial.
Suppose for example that consumers who want to adjust their consumption upwards in response
to an expected income increase need to face the cost of negotiating a loan with a bank. It is
likely that the utility loss from not adjusting fully to the new equilibrium is relatively small when
the expected income increase is small, which suggests that no adjustment would take place if the
13However, liquidity constraints have asymmetric e⁄ects. A transitory tax cut, which raises consumers￿disposable
income temporarily, invites savings not borrowing (unless the consumer is already consuming sub-optimally). In
contrast, temporary tax hikes may have strong e⁄ects if borrowing is not available. On the other hand unanticipated
stabilization interpretation may increase uncertainty and hence precautionary savings.
13transaction cost associated with negotiating a loan is high enough.14 This ￿magnitude hypothesis￿
has been formally tested by Scholnick (2010), who use a large data set provided by a Canadian
bank that includes information on both credit cards spending as well as mortgage payment records.
As in Stephens (2008) he argues that the ￿nal mortgage payment represent an expected shock to
disposable income (that is, income net of pre-committed debt service payments). His test of the
magnitude hypothesis looks at whether the response of consumption to expected income increases
depends on the relative amount of mortgage payments. See also Chetty and Szeidl (2007).15
Outside the quadratic preference world, uncertainty about future income realizations will also
impact consumption. The response of consumers to an increase in risk is to reduce consumption -
or increase savings. This opens up another path for stabilization policies. If the policy objective is
to stimulate consumption, one way of achieving this would be to reduce the risk that people face.
We consider more realistic preference speci￿cations in the following section.
2.2 Beyond the PIH
The beauty of the model with quadratic preferences is that it gives very sharp predictions regarding
the impact on consumption of various types of income shocks. For example, there is the sharp
prediction that permanent shocks are entirely consumed (an MPC of 1). Unfortunately, quadratic
preferences have well known undesirable features, such as increasing risk aversion and lack of a
precautionary motive for saving. Do the prediction of this model survive under more realistic
assumptions about preferences? The answer is: only qualitatively. The problem with more realistic
preferences, such as CRRA, is that they deliver no closed form solution for consumption - that
is, there is no analytical expression for the "consumption function" and hence the value of the
propensity to consume in response to risk (income shocks) is not easily derivable. This is also the
14The magnitude argument could also explain Hsieh￿ s (1999) puzzling ￿ndings that consumption is excessively
sensitive to tax refunds but not payments from the Alaska Permanent Fund. In fact, tax refunds are typically
smaller than payments from the Alaska Permanent fund (although the actual amount of the latter is somewhat more
uncertain).
15Another element that may matter, but it has been neglected in the literature, is the time distance that separates
the announcement of the income change from its actual occurrence. The smaller the time distance, the lower the
utility loss from inaction.
14reason why the literature moved on to estimating Euler equations after Hall (1978). The advantage
of the Euler equation approach is that one can be silent about the sources of uncertainty faced
by the consumer (including crucially the stochastic structure of the income process). However,
in the Euler equation context only a limited set of parameters (preference parameters such as the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution or the intertemporal discount rate) can be estimated.16 Our
reading is that there is some dissatisfaction in the literature regarding the evidence coming from
Euler equation estimates (see Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Attanasio and Weber, 2010).
Recently there has been an attempt to go back to the concept of a "consumption function".
Two approaches have been followed. First, the Euler equation that describe the expected dynamics
of the growth in the marginal utility can be approximated to describe the dynamics of consumption
growth. Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008), extending Blundell and Preston (1998) (see also
Blundell and Stoker, 1994), derive an approximation of the mapping between the expectation error
of the Euler equation and the income shock. Carroll (2001) and Kaplan and Violante (2009) discuss
numerical simulations in the bu⁄er-stock and Bewley model, respectively. We discuss the results
of these two approaches in turn.
2.2.1 Approximation of the Euler equation
Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) consider the consumption problem faced by household i of
age a in period t. Assuming that preferences are of the CRRA form, the objective is to choose a













where Zi;a+j;t+j incorporates taste shifters (such as age, household composition, etc.), and we
denote with Ea (:) = E (:j￿i;a;t). Maximization of (6) is subject to the budget constraint which in
16And even that limited objective has proved di¢ cult to achieve, due to limited cross-sectional variability in interest
rates and short panels. See Attanasio and Low (2004).
15the self-insurance model assumes individuals have access to a risk free bond with real return r
Aia+j+1 = (1 + r)(Ai;a+j;t+j + Yi;a+j;t+j ￿ Ci;a+j;t+j) (7)
Ai;a;t = 0 (8)
with Ai;a;t given. Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) set the retirement age after which labor
income falls to zero at L, assumed known and certain, and the end of the life-cycle at age A. They
assume that there is no uncertainty about the date of death. With budget constraint (7), optimal
consumption choices can be described by the Euler equation (assuming for simplicity that there is
no preference heterogeneity, or #a = 0):
C
￿￿
i;a￿1;t￿1 = ￿ (1 + r)Ea￿1C
￿￿
i;a;t: (9)
As it is, equation (9) is not useful for empirical purposes. Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008)
show that the Euler equation can be approximated as follows:
￿logCi;a;t ’ ￿i;a;t + fC
i;a;t





i;a;t captures any slope in the con-
sumption path due to interest rates, impatience or precautionary savings and the error in the
approximation is O(Ea￿2
i;a;t).17 Suppose that any idiosyncratic component to this gradient to the
consumption path can be adequately picked up by a vector of deterministic characteristics ￿c
i;a;t
and a stochastic individual element ￿i;a
￿logCi;a;t ￿ ￿c
i;a;t = ￿ci;a;t ’ ￿i;a;t + ￿i;a;t:
Assume log income is
logYi;a;t = pi;a;t + "i;a;t (10)
pi;a;t = ￿
y
i;a;t + pi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿i;a;t (11)
17This is an approximation for the logarithm of the sum of an arbitrary series of variables.
16where ￿
y
i;a;t represent observable characteristic in￿ uencing the growth of income. Income growth
can be written as:
￿logYi;a;t ￿ ￿
y
i;a;t = ￿yi;a;t = ￿i;a;t + ￿"i;a;t:











where A is the age of death and L is the retirement age. Applying the approximation above and
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￿logCi;a;t ’ ￿i;a;t + ￿i;a;t￿i;a;t + ￿a￿i;a;t"i;a;t (12)
with a similar order of approximation error.19 The random term ￿i;a;t can be interpreted as the
innovation to higher moments of the income process.20 As we shall see, Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004) ￿nd evidence of this using PSID data.
The interpretation of the impact of income shocks on consumption growth in the PIH model
with CRRA preferences is straightforward. For individuals a long time from the end of their life
with the value of current ￿nancial assets small relative to remaining future labor income, ￿i;a;t ’ 1,
18Blundell, Low and Preston (2004) contains a lengthier derivation of such an expression, including discussion of
the order of magnitude of the approximation error involved.
19Results from a simulation of a stochastic economy presented in Blundell, Low and Preston (2004) show that the
approximation (9) can be used to accurately detect changes in the time series pattern of permanent and transitory
variances to income shocks.
20This characterization follows Caballero (1990), who presents a model with stochastic higher moments of the
income distribution. He shows that there are two types of innovation a⁄ecting consumption growth: innovation




, and ￿a term that takes into account revisions in variance forecast￿
(￿i;a;t). Note that this term is not capturing precautionary savings per se, but the innovation to the consumption
component that generates it (i.e., consumption growth due to precautionary savings will change to accommodate
changes in the forecast of the amount of uncertainty one expects in the future).
17and permanent shocks pass through more or less completely into consumption whereas transitory
shocks are (almost) completely insured against through saving. Precautionary saving can provide
e⁄ective self-insurance against permanent shocks only if the stock of assets built up is large relative
to future labor income, which is to say ￿i;a;t is appreciably smaller than unity, in which case there
will also be some smoothing of permanent shocks through self insurance.
The most important feature of the approximation approach is to show that the e⁄ect of an
income shock on consumption depends not only on the persistence of the shock and the planning
horizon (as in the LC-PIH case with quadratic preferences), but also on preference parameters.
Ceteris paribus, the consumption of more prudent households will respond less to income shocks.
The reason is that they can use their accumulated stock of precautionary wealth to smooth the
impact of the shocks (for which they were saving precautiously against in the ￿rst place). Simulation
results (below) con￿rm this basic intuition.
2.2.2 Kaplan and Violante
Kaplan and Violante (2010) investigate the amount of consumption insurance present in a life-cycle
version of the standard incomplete markets model with heterogenous agents (e.g., Rios-Rull, 1995;
Huggett, 1996). Kaplan and Violante￿ s setup di⁄ers from that in Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston
by adding the uncertainty component ￿a to life expectancy, and by omitting the taste shifters from
the utility function. ￿a is the probability of dying at age a. It is set to 0 for all a < L (the known
retirement age) and it is greater than 0 for L ￿ a ￿ A. The KV model also di⁄ers from BPP
by specifying a realistic social security system. Two baseline setups are investigated - a natural
borrowing constraint setup (henceforth NBC), in which consumers are only constrained by their
budget constraint, and a zero borrowing constraint setup (henceforth ZBC), in which consumers
have to maintain non-negative assets at all ages. The income process is similar to BPP.21 Part of
21There are two di⁄erences though: Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) allow for an MA(1) transitory compo-
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Figure 2: Age pro￿le of insurance coe¢ cients for transitory and permanent income shocks.
KV￿ s analysis is designed to check whether the amount of insurance predicted by the Bewley model
can be consistently estimated using the identi￿cation strategy proposed by BPP and whether BPP￿ s
estimates using PSID and CEX data conform to values obtained from calibrating their theoretical
model.
KV￿ s model is calibrated to match the US data. Survival rates are obtained from the NCHS,
the intertemporal discount rate is calibrated to match a wealth-income ratio of 2.5, the permanent
shock parameters (￿2
￿ and the variance of the initial draw of the process) are calibrated to match
PSID data and the variance of the transitory shock (￿2
") is set to the 1990-1992 BPP point estimate
(0.05). The KV model is solved numerically. This allows for the calculation of both the "true"22
and the BPP estimators of the "partial insurance parameters" (the response of consumption to
permanent and transitory income shocks).
Figure 2 is reproduced from Kaplan and Violante (2009).23 It plots the theoretical marginal
propensity to consume for the transitory shocks (upper panels) and the permanent shocks (lower
22"True" in this context is in the sense of the actual insurance parameters given the model data generating process.
23We thank Gianluca Violante for providing the data.
19panels) against age (continuous line) and those obtained using BPP￿ s identi￿cation methodology
(dashed line). The right panels refer to the NBC environment; the left panels to the ZBC envi-
ronment. A number of interesting ￿ndings emerge. First, in the NBC environment the MPC with
respect to transitory shocks is fairly low throughout the life cycle, and similarly to what is shown
in Figure 1, increases over the life cycle due to reduced planning horizon e⁄ect. The life cycle
average MPC is 0.06. Second, there is considerable insurance also against the permanent shock,
which increases over the life cycle due to the ability to use the accumulated wealth to smooth these
shocks. The life cycle average MPC is 0.77, well below the MPC of 1 predicted by the in￿nite
horizon PIH model.24 Third, the ZBC environment a⁄ects only the ability to insure transitory
shocks (which depend on having access to loans), but not the ability to insure permanent shocks
(which depend on having access to a storage technology, and hence it is not a⁄ected by credit
restrictions). Fourth, the performance of the BPP estimators is remarkably good. Only in the
case of the ZBC environment and the permanent shock does the BPP estimator display an upward
bias, and even in that case only very early in the life cycle. According to KV the source of the
bias is the failure of the orthogonality condition used by BPP for agents close to the borrowing
constraint. It is worth noting that the ZBC environment is somewhat extreme as it assumes no
unsecured borrowing. Finally, KV compare the average MPCs obtained in their model (0.06 and
0.77) with the actual estimates obtained by BPP using actual data. As we shall see, BPP ￿nd
an estimate of the MPC with respect to permanent shocks of 0.64 (s.e. 0.09) and an estimate of
the MPC with respect to transitory shocks of 0.05 (s.e. 0.04). Clearly, the "theoretical" MPCs
found by KV lie well in the con￿dence interval of BPP￿ s estimates. One thing that seems not to
be borne out in the data is that theoretically the degree of smoothing of permanent shocks should
be strictly increasing and convex with age, while BPP report increasing amount of insurance with
24Blundell, Low and Preston (2008) simulate the model described in the Appendix of BPP using their estimates of
the income process and ￿nd a value of ￿i;a;t of 0.8 or a little lower for individuals aged twenty years before retirement.
Carroll (2001) presents simulations that show for a bu⁄er stock model in which consumers face both transitory and
permanent income shocks, the steady state value of ￿i;a;t is between 0.75 and 0.92 for a wide range of plausible
parameter values.
20age as a non-signi￿cant ￿nding.25 As discussed by Kaplan and Violante (2010), the theoretical
pattern of the smoothing coe¢ cients is the result of two forces: a wealth composition e⁄ect and
a horizon e⁄ect. The increase in wealth over the life cycle due to precautionary and retirement
motives means that agents are better insured against shocks. As the horizon shortens, the e⁄ect of
permanent shock resembles increasingly that of a transitory shock.
Given that the response of consumption to shocks of various nature is so di⁄erent (and so
relevant for policy in theory and practice), it is natural to turn to studies that analyze the nature
and persistence of the income process.
3 Modeling the Income Process
In this section we discuss the speci￿cation and estimation of the income process. Two main ap-
proaches will be discussed. The ￿rst looks at earnings as a whole, and interprets risk as the
year-to-year volatility that cannot be explained by certain observables (with various degrees of so-
phistication). The second approach assumes that part of the variability in earnings is endogenous
(induced by choices). In the ￿rst approach, researchers assume that consumers receive an uncertain
but exogenous ￿ ow of earnings in each period. This literature has two objectives: (a) identi￿cation
of the correct process for earnings, (b) identi￿cation of the information set - which de￿nes the
concept of an "innovation". In the second approach, the concept of risk needs revisiting, because
one ￿rst needs to identify the "primitive" risk factors. For example, if endogenous ￿ uctuations
in earnings were to come exclusively from people freely choosing their hours, the "primitive" risk
factor would be the hourly wage. We will discuss this second approach at the end of the chapter,
in Section 5.
There are various models proposed in the literature aimed at addressing the issue of how to
model risk in exogenous earnings. They typically model earnings as the sum of a number of random
components. These components di⁄er in a number of respects, but primarily: their persistence,
25Hall and Mishkin (1982) reported similar ￿ndings for their MPC out of transitory shocks (the factor ￿a in
equation 5).
21whether there are time- (or age- or experience-) varying loading factors attached to them, and
whether they are economically relevant or just measurement error. We discuss these various models
in Section 3.1. As said in the Introduction, to have an idea about the correct income process is key to
understanding the response of consumption to income shocks.26 As for the issue of information set,
the question that is being asked is whether the consumer knows more than the econometrician.27
This is sometimes known as the superior information issue. The individual may have advance
information about events such as a promotion, that the econometrician may never hope to predict
on the basis of observables (unless, of course, promotions are perfectly predictable on the basis of
things like seniority within a ￿rm, education, etc.).28
In general, a researcher￿ s identi￿cation strategy for the correct DGP for income, earnings or
wages will be a⁄ected by data availability. While the ideal data set is a long, large panel of
individuals, this is somewhat a rare event and can be plagued by problems such as attrition (see
Baker and Solon, 2003, for an exception). More frequently, researchers have available panel data
on individuals, but the sample size is limited, especially if one restricts the attention to a balanced
sample (for example, Baker, 1997; MaCurdy, 1982). Alternatively, one could use an unbalanced
panel (as in Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004, and Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, 2004). An
important exception is the case where countries have available administrative data sources with
reports on earnings or income from tax returns or social security records. The important advantage
26Another reason why having an idea of the right earnings process is important emerges in the treatment e⁄ect
litereature. Whether the TTE (treatment-on-the-treated e⁄ect) can be estimated from simple comparison of means
for treated and untreated individuals depends (among other things) on the persistence of earnings.
27Other papers have considered the consequences of the opposite assumption, i..e, cases in which consumers know
less than the econometrician (Pischke, 1995). To consider a simple example, assume a standard transitory/permanent
income process. Individuals who are unable to distinguish the two components will record a (non-stationary) MA(1)
process. The interesting issue is how much consumers lose from ignoring (or failing to investigate) the correct
income process they face. The cost of investing in collecting information may depend on size of the income changes,
inattention costs, salience considerations, etc.
28A possible way to assess the discrepancy of information between the household and the econometrician is to
compare measures of uncertainty obtained via estimation of dynamic income processes with measures of risk recovered
from subjective expectations data. Data on the subjective distribution of future incomes or the probability of future
unemployment are now becoming available for many countries, including the US (in particular, the Survey of Economic
Expectations and the Health and Retirement Survey), and have been used, among others, by Dominitz and Manski
(1998) and Barsky et al. (1997). This is an interesting avenue for future empirical research which we discuss further
in Section 4.
22of such data sets is the accuracy of the information provided and the lack of attrition, other than
what is due to migration and death. The important disadvantage is the lack of other information
that is pertinent to modelling, such as hours of work and in some cases education or occupation,
depending on the source of the data. Even less frequently, one may have available employer-
employee matched data sets, with which it may be possible to identify the role of ￿rm heterogeneity
separately from that of individual heterogeneity, either in a descriptive way such as in Abowd,
Kramarz and Margolis (1999), or allowing also for shocks, such as in Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi
(2005), or in a more structural fashion as in Postel Vinay and Robin (2002), Cahuc, Postel Vinay
and Robin (2006), Postel-Vinay and Turon (2009) and Lise, Meghir and Robin (2009). Less frequent
and more limited in scope is the use of pseudo-panel data, which misses the variability induced by
genuine idiosyncratic shocks, but at least allows for some results to be established where long panel
data is not available (see Banks, Blundell and Brugiavini, 2001, and Mo¢ tt, 1993).
3.1 Speci￿cations
The typical speci￿cation of income processes found in the literature is implicitly or explicitly moti-
vated by Friedman￿ s permanent income hypothesis, which has led to an emphasis on the distinction
between permanent and transitory shocks to income. Of course things are never as simple as that:
permanent shocks may not be as permanent and transitory shocks may be reasonably persistent.
Finally, what may pass as a permanent shock may sometimes be heterogeneity in disguise. Indeed
these issues fuel a lively debate in this ￿eld, which may not be possible to resolve without identi-
fying assumptions. In this section we present a reasonably general speci￿cation that encompasses
a number of views in the literature and then discuss estimation of this model.
We denote by Yi;a;t a measure of income (such as earnings) for individual i of age a in period
t. This is typically taken to be annual earnings and individuals not working over a whole year are
usually dropped.29 Issues having to do with selection and endogenous labour supply decisions will
29In the literature the focus is mainly on employed workers and self-employed workers are typically also dropped.
This is a particularly important selection for the purpose of measuring risk given that the self-employed face much
higher earnings risk than the employed. On the other hand, this avoids accounting for endogenous selection into
self-employment based on risk preferences (see Skinner, 1987; Guiso, Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2002; Fuchs-Schuendeln
and Schuendeln, 2005).
23be dealt with in a separate section. Many of the speci￿cations for the income process take the form
lnY e
i;a;t = de
t + ￿e0Xi;a;t + ui;a;t (13)
In the above e denotes a particular group (such as education and sex) and Xi;a;t will typically
include a polynomial in age as well as other characteristics including region, race and sometimes
marital status. From now on we omit the superscript "e" to simplify notation. In (13) the error
term ui;a;t is de￿ned such that E (ui;a;tjXi;a;t) = 0. This allows us to work with residual log income
d yi;a;t = lnYi;a;t ￿ ^ dt ￿ ^ ￿0Xi;a;t where ^ ￿ and the aggregate time e⁄ects ^ dt can be estimated using
OLS. Henceforth we will ignore this ￿rst step and we will work directly with residual log income
yi;a;t, where the e⁄ect of observable characteristics and common aggregate time trends have been
eliminated.
The key element of the speci￿cation in (13) is the time series properties of ui;a;t. A speci￿cation
than encompasses many of the ideas in the literature is
ui;a;t = a ￿ fi + vi;a;t + pi;a;t + mi;a;t
vi;a;t = ￿q(L)"i;a;t Transitory process
Pp(L)pi;a;t = ￿i;a;t Permanent process
(14)
where L is a lag operator such that Lzi;a;t = zi;a￿1;t￿1. In (14) the stochastic process consists of
an individual speci￿c lifecycle trend (a￿fi); a transitory shock vi;a;t, which is modelled as an MA
process whose lag polynomial of order q is denoted ￿q(L); a permanent shock Pp(L)pi;a;t = ￿i;a;t,
which is an autoregressive process with high levels of persistence possibly including a unit root,
also expressed in the lag polynomial of order p, Pp(L); and measurement error mi;a;t which may be
taken as classical iid or not.
3.1.1 A Simple Model of Earnings Dynamics
We start with the relatively simpler representation where the term a ￿ fi is excluded. Moreover
we restrict the lag polynomials ￿(L) and P(L): it is not generally possible to identify ￿(L) and
P(L) without any further restrictions. Thus we start with the typical speci￿cation used for example
24in MaCurdy (1982) and Abowd and Card (1989):
ui;a;t = vi;a;t + pi;a;t + mi;a;t
vi;a;t = "i;a;t ￿ ￿"i;a￿1;t￿1 Transitory process
pi;a;t = pi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿i;a;t Permanent process
pi;0;t￿a = hi
(15)
with mi;a;t, ￿i;a;t and "i;a;t all being independently and identically distributed and where hi re￿ ects
initial heterogeneity, which here persists forever through the random walk (a = 0 is the age of entry
in the labor market, which may di⁄er across groups due to di⁄erent school leaving ages). Generally,
as we will show, the existence of classical measurement error causes problems in the identi￿cation
of the transitory shock process.
There are two principal motivations for the permanent/transitory decompositions: the ￿rst
motivation draws from economics: the decomposition re￿ ects well the original insights of Friedman
(1957) by distinguishing how consumption can react to di⁄erent types of income shock, while
introducing uncertainty in the model.30 The second is statistical: At least for the US and for
the UK the variance of income increases over the life-cycle (see Figure 3, which uses consumption
data from the CEX and income data from the PSID). This, together with the increasing life cycle
variance of consumption points to a unit root in income, as we shall see below. Moreover, income
growth (￿lnyi;a;t) has limited serial correlation and behaves very much like an MA process of order
2 or three: this property is delivered by the fact that all shocks above are assumed iid. In our
example growth in income has been restricted to an MA(2).31
Even in such a tight speci￿cation identi￿cation is not straightforward: as we will illustrate we
cannot separately identify the parameter ￿; the variance of the measurement error and the variance
of the transitory shock. But ￿rst consider the identi￿cation of the variance of the permanent shock.
De￿ne unexplained earnings growth as:
gi;a;t ￿ ￿yi;a;t = ￿mi;a;t + (1 + ￿L)￿"i;a;t + ￿i;a;t: (16)
30See Meghir (2004) for a description and interpretation of Friedman￿ s contribution.
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Figure 3: The variance of log income (from the PSID) and log consumption (from the CEX) over
the life cycle.


















where q is the order of the moving average process in the original levels equation; in our example
q = 1: Hence, if we know the order of serial correlation of the log income we can identify the variance
of the permanent shock without any need to identify the variance of the measurement error or the
parameters of the MA process. Indeed, in the absence of a permanent shock the moment in (17)
will be zero, which o⁄ers a way of testing for the presence of a permanent component conditional
on knowing the order of the MA process. If the order of the MA process is one in the levels, then
to implement this we will need at least six individual-level observations to construct this moment.
The moment is then averaged over individuals and the relevant asymptotic theory for inference is
one that relies on a large number of individuals N:
At this point we need to mention two potential complications with the econometrics. First,
when carrying out inference we have to take into account that yi;a;t has been constructed using
the pre-estimated parameters dt and ￿ in equation (13). Correcting the standard errors for this
generated regressor problem is relatively simple to do and can be done either analytically, based
26on the delta method, or just by using the bootstrap. Second, as said above to estimate such a
model we may have to rely on panel data where individuals have been followed for the necessary
minimum number of periods/years (6 in our example); this means that our results may be biased
due to endogenous attrition. In practice any adjustment for this is going to be extremely hard to do
because we usually do not observe variables that can adequately explain attrition and at the same
time do not explain earnings. Administrative data may o⁄er a promising alternative to relying on
attrition-prone panel data.
The order of the MA process for vi;a;t will not be known in practice and it has to be estimated.
This can be done by estimating the autocovariance structure of gi;a;t and deciding a priori on
the suitable criterion for judging whether they should be taken as zero. One approach followed
in practice is to use the t-statistic or the F-statistics for higher order autocovariances. However,
we need to recognize that given an estimate of q the analysis that follows is conditional on that
estimate of q, which in turn can a⁄ect inference, particularly for the importance of the variance of







3.1.2 Estimating and identifying the properties of the transitory shock.
The next issue is the identi￿cation of the parameters of the moving average process of the transitory
shock and those of measurement error. It turns out that the model is underidenti￿ed, which is
not surprising: in our example we need to estimate three parameters, namely the variance of the
transitory shock ￿2
" = E("2
i;a;t); the MA coe¢ cient ￿ and the variance of the measurement error
￿2
m = E(m2
i;a;t).32 To illustrate the under identi￿cation point suppose that j￿j < 1 and assume
that the measurement error is independently and identically distributed. We take as given that
q = 1. Then the autocovariances of order higher than three will be zero, whatever the value of our







m = ￿E (gi;a;tgi;a￿1;t￿1) ￿
(1+￿)2
￿ E (gi;a;tgi;a￿2;t￿2) II
(18)
32Assuming as we do below that the measurement error is iid.
27The sign of E (gi;a;tgi;a￿2;t￿2) de￿nes the sign of ￿. Taking the two variances as functions of the
MA coe¢ cient we note two points. First, ￿2
m (￿) declines and ￿2
" (￿) increases when ￿ declines in
absolute value. Second, for su¢ ciently low values of j￿j the estimated variance of the measurement
error ￿2
m (￿) may become negative. Given the sign of ￿ (de￿ned by I in equation 18) this fact




where e ￿ is the negative value of ￿ that sets ￿2
m in (18) to zero. If ￿ was found to be positive the
bounds would be in a positive range. The bounds on ￿ in turn de￿ne bounds on ￿2
" and ￿2
m:
An alternative empirical strategy is to rely on an external estimate of the variance of the
measurement error, ￿2


















= ￿(1 + ￿)
2 ￿2
"
E (gi;a;tgi;a￿2;t￿2) = ￿￿2
"
where ￿2
m is available externally. The three moments above depend only on ￿, ￿2
￿ and ￿2
m. We can
then estimate these parameters using a Minimum Distance procedure.
Such external measures can sometimes be obtained through validation studies. For example,
Bound and Krueger (1991) conduct a validation study of the CPS data on earnings and conclude
that measurement error explains 28 percent of the overall variance of the rate of growth of earnings
in the CPS. Bound et al. (1994) ￿nd a value of 22 percent using the PSID-Validation Study.33
3.1.3 Estimating Alternative Income Processes
Time varying impacts An alternative speci￿cation with very di⁄erent implications is one
where
lnYi;a;t = ￿lnYi;a￿1;t￿1 + dt(X0
i;a;t￿ + hi + vi;a;t) + mi;a;t (19)
where hi is a ￿xed e⁄ect while vi;a;t follows some MA process and mi;a;t is measurement error
(see Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen, 1988). This process can be estimated by method of moments
33See Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz (2001) for a recent survey of the growing literature on measurement error in
micro data.
28following a suitable transformation of the model. De￿ne ￿t = dt=dt￿1and quasi-di⁄erence to obtain:
lnYi;a;t = (￿+￿t)lnYi;a￿1;t￿1￿￿t￿lnYi;a￿2;t￿2+dt(￿X0
i;a;t￿ +￿vi;a;t)+mi;a;t￿￿tmi;a￿1;t￿1 (20)
In this model the persistence of the shocks is captured by the autoregressive component of lnY
which means that the e⁄ects of time varying characteristics are persistent to an extent. Given
estimates of the levels equation in (20) the autocovariance structure of the residuals can be used
to identify the properties of the error term dt￿vi;a;t + mi;a;t ￿ ￿tmi;a￿1;t￿1:
Alternatively, the ￿xed e⁄ect with the autoregressive component can be replaced by a random
walk in a similar type of model. This could take the form
lnYi;a;t = dt(X0
i;a;t￿ + pi;a;t + vi;a;t) + mi;a;t (21)
In this model pi;a;t = pi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿i;a;t as before, but the shocks have a di⁄erent e⁄ect depending
on aggregate conditions. Given ￿xed T a linear regression in levels can provide estimates for dt,
which can now be treated as known.
Now de￿ne ￿t = dt=dt￿1 and consider the following transformation
lnYi;a;t ￿ ￿t lnYi;a￿1;t￿1 = dt(￿i;a;t + ￿vi;a;t) + mi;a;t ￿ ￿tmi;a￿1;t￿1 (22)
The autocovariance structure of lnYi;a;t ￿ ￿t lnYi;a￿1;t￿1 can be used to estimate the variances of
the shocks, very much like in the previous examples. In general again we will not be able to identify
separately the variance of the transitory shock from that of measurement error, just like before. In
general, one can construct a number of variants of the above model but we will move on to another
important speci￿cation, keeping from now on any macroeconomic e⁄ects additive.
It should be noted that (22) is a popular model among labor economists but not among macro-
economists. One reason is that it is hard to use in macro models ￿one needs to know the entire
sequence of prices, address general equilibrium issues, etc.
Stochastic growth in Earnings Now consider generalizing in a di⁄erent way the income
process and allow the residual income growth (16) to become
gi;a;t = fi + ￿mi;a;t + (1 + ￿L)￿"i;a;t + ￿i;a;t (23)
29where the fi is a ￿xed e⁄ect. The fundamental di⁄erence of this speci￿cation from the one presented
before is that income growth of a particular individual will be correlated over time. In the particular
speci￿cation above, all theoretical autocovariances of order three or above will be equal to the
variance of the ￿xed e⁄ect fi. Consider starting with the null hypothesis that the model is of the
form presented in (15) but with an unknown order for the MA process governing the transitory
shock vi;a;t = ￿q(L)"i;a;t: In practice we will have a panel data set containing some ￿nite number
of time series observations but a large number of individuals, which de￿nes the maximum order
of autocovariance that can be estimated. In the PSID these can be about 30 (using annual data).
The pattern of empirical autocovariances consistent with (16) is one where they decline abruptly
and become all insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero beyond that point. The pattern consistent with
(23) is one where the autocovariances are never zero but after a point become all equal to each
other, which is an estimate of the variance of fi:
Evidence reported in MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989), Topel and Ward (1992),
Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1994), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and others all ￿nd similar results:
Autocovariances decline in absolute value, they are statistically insigni￿cant after the 1st or 2nd
order, and have no clear tendency to be positive. They interpret this as evidence that there is no
random growth term. Figure 4 use PSID data and plot the second, third and fourth order autoco-
variances of earnings growth (with 95% con￿dence intervals) against calendar time. They con￿rm
the ￿ndings in the literature: After the second lag no autocovariance is statistically signi￿cant for
any of the years considered, and there are as many positive estimates as negative ones. In fact,
there is no clear pattern in these estimates.
With a long enough panel and a large number of cross sectional observations we should be able
to detect the di⁄erence between the two patterns. However, there are a number of practical and
theoretical di¢ culties. First, with the usual panel data, the higher order autocovariances are likely
to be estimated based on a relatively low number of individuals. This, together with the fact that
the residuals already contain noise from removing the estimated e⁄ects of characteristics such as
age and even time e⁄ects will mean that higher order autocovariances are likely to be imprecisely
estimated, even if the variance of fi is indeed non-zero. Perhaps administrative data is one way
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Figure 4: Second to fourth order autocovariances of earnings growth, PSID 1967-1997.
31such data is not always available either because it is not organized in a usable way or because of
co￿ndentiality issues.
The other issue is that without a clearly articulated hypothesis we may not be able to distinguish
among many possible alternatives, because we do not know the order of the MA process, q; or even
if we should be using an MA or AR representation, or if the "permanent component" has a unit
root or less. If we did, we could formulate a method of moments estimator and, subject to the
constraints from the amount of years we observe, we could estimate our model and test our null
hypothesis.
The practical identi￿cation problem is well illustrated by an argument in Guvenen (2009).
Consider the possibility that the component we have been referring to as permanent, pi;a;t; does
not follow a random walk, but follows some stationary autoregressive process. In this case the
increase in the variance over the lifecycle will be captured by the term a ￿ fi. The theoretical
autocovariances of gi;a;t will never become exactly zero; they will start negative and gradually
increase asymptoting to a positive number which will be the variance of fi, say ￿2
f. Speci￿cally if
pi;a;t = ￿pi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿i;a;t with j￿j < 1, there is no other transitory stochastic component, and the
variance of the initial draw of the permanent component is zero, the autocovariances of order k
have the form







￿ for k > 0 (24)
As ￿ approaches one the autocovariances will approach ￿2
f. However, the autocovariance in (24) is
the sum of a positive and a negative component. Guvenen (2009) has shown based on simulations
that it is almost impossible in practice with the usual sample sizes to distinguish the implied pattern
of the autocovariances from (24) from the one estimated from PSID data. The key problem with
this is that the usual panel data that is available either follows individuals for a limited number
of time periods, or su⁄ers from severe attrition, which is probably not random, introducing biases.
Thus, in practice it is very di¢ cult to identify the nature of the income process without some
prior assumptions and without combining information with another process, such as consumption
or labour supply.
Haider and Solon (2006) provide a further illustration of how di¢ cult is to distinguish one model
from the other. They are interested in the association between current and lifetime income. They
32Figure 5: Estimates of ￿a from Haider and Solon (2006).
write current log earnings as
yi;a;t = hi + afi
and lifetime earnings as (approximately)
logVi = r ￿ logr + hi + r￿1fi








Hence, the model predicts that ￿a should increase linearly with age. In the absence of a random
growth term (￿2
f = 0), ￿a = 1 at all ages. Figure 5, reproduced from Haider and Solon (2006)
shows that there is evidence of a linear growth in ￿a only early in the life cycle (up until age 35);
however, between age 35 and age 50 there is no evidence of a linear growth in ￿a(if anything, there
is evidence that ￿a declines and one fails to reject the hypothesis ￿a = 1); ￿nally, after age 50, there
is evidence of a decline in ￿a that does not square well with any random growth term in earnings.
Other Enrichments/Issues The literature has addressed many other interesting issues hav-
ing to do with wage dynamics, which here we only mention in passing. First, the importance of
33￿rm or match e⁄ects. Matched employer-employee data could be used to address these issues,
and indeed some papers have taken important steps in this direction (see Abowd, Kramaz and
Margolis, 1999; Postel Vinay and Robin, 2002; Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi, 2005).
A number of papers have remarked that wages fall dramatically at job displacement, gener-
ating so-called "scarring￿e⁄ects (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993; von Wachter, Song and
Manchester, 2007). The nature of these scarring e⁄ects is still not very well understood. On the
one hand, people may be paid lower wages after a spell of unemployment due to fast depreciation
of their skills (Ljunqvist and Sargent, 1998). Another explanation could be loss of speci￿c human
capital that may be hard to immediately replace at a random ￿rm upon re-entry (see Low, Meghir
and Pistaferri, 2010).
3.1.4 The conditional variance of earnings
The typical empirical strategy followed in the precautionary savings literature in the attempt to
understand the role of risk in shaping household asset accumulation choices typically proceeds in
two steps. In the ￿rst step, risk is estimated from a univariate ARMA process for earnings (similar
to one of those described earlier). Usually the variance of the residual is the assumed measure of risk.
There are some variants of this typical strategy- for example, allowing for transitory and permanent
income shocks. In the second step, the outcome of interest (assets, savings, or consumption growth)
is regressed onto the measure of risk obtained in the ￿rst stage, or simulations are used to infer
the importance of the precautionary motive for saving. Examples include Banks, Blundell and
Brugiavini (2001) and Zeldes (1989). In one of the earlier attempts to quantify the importance
of the precautionary motive for saving, Caballero (1990) concluded ￿ using estimates of risk from
MaCurdy (1982)- that precautionary savings could explain about 60% of asset accumulation in the
US.
A few recent papers have taken up the issue of risk measurement (i.e., modeling the conditional
variance of earnings) in a more complex way. Here we comment primarily on Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004).34
34See also Jensen and Shore (2008) for a similar approach.
34Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) Returning to the model presented in section 3.1.1 we can extend
this by allowing the variances of the shocks to follow a dynamic structure with heterogeneity. A
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i;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿i Permanent
(25)
where Et￿1 (:) denotes an expectation conditional on information available at time t ￿ 1. The
parameters are all education-speci￿c. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) test whether they vary across
education. The terms ￿t and ’t are year e⁄ects which capture the way that the variance of the tran-
sitory and permanent shocks change over time, respectively. In the empirical analysis they also allow
for life-cycle e⁄ects. In this speci￿cation we can interpret the lagged shocks ("i;a￿1;t￿1;￿i;a￿1;t￿1) as
re￿ ecting the way current information is used to form revisions in expected risk. Hence it is a nat-
ural speci￿cation when thinking of consumption models which emphasize the role of the conditional
variance in determining savings and consumption decisions.
The terms ￿i and ￿i are ￿xed e⁄ects that capture all those elements that are invariant over time
and re￿ ect long term occupational choices, etc. The latter re￿ ects permanent variability of income
due to factors unobserved by the econometrician. Such variability may in part have to do with
the particular occupation or job that the individual has chosen. This variability will be known by
the individuals when they make their occupational choices and hence it also re￿ ects preferences.
Whether this variability re￿ ects permanent risk or not is of course another issue which is di¢ cult
to answer without explicitly modeling behavior.35
As far as estimating the mean and variance process of earnings is concerned, this model does
not require the explicit speci￿cation of the distribution of the shocks; moreover the possibility
that higher order moments are heterogeneous and/or follow some kind of dynamic process is not
excluded. In this sense it is very well suited for investigating some key properties of the income
process. Indeed this is important, because as we will see later on the properties of the variance of
35An interesting possibility allowed in ARCH models for time-series data is that of asymmetry of response to shocks.
In other words, the conditional variance function is allowed to respond asymmetrically to positive and negative past
shocks. This could be interesting here as well, for a considerable amount of asymmetry in the distribution of earnings
is related to unemployment. Caballero (1990) shows that asymmetric distributions enhance the need for precautionary
savings. In the case discussed here, however, models embedding the notion of asymmetry are not identi￿able. The
reason is that the transitory and permanent shocks are not separately observable.
35income will have implications for consumption and savings.
However, this comes at a price: ￿rst, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) need to impose linear sep-
arability of heterogeneity and dynamics in both the mean and the variance. This allows them to
deal with the initial conditions problem without any instruments. Second, they do not have a
complete model that would allow them to simulate consumption pro￿les. Hence the model must
be completed by specifying the entire distribution.
Identi￿cation of the ARCH process If the shocks " and ￿ were observable it would be
straightforward to estimate the parameters of the ARCH process in (25). However they are not.
What we do observe (or can estimate) is gi;a;t = ￿mi;a;t + (1 + ￿L)￿"i;a;t + ￿i;a;t: To add to the
complication we have already argued that ￿ is not point identi￿ed. Nevertheless the following two
key moment conditions identify the parameters of the ARCH process, conditional on the unobserved
heterogeneity (￿ and ￿):















The important point here is that it is su¢ cient to know the order of the MA process q.36 We
do not need to know the parameters themselves. The parameter ￿ that appears in (26) for the
transitory shock is just absorbed by the time e⁄ects on the variance or the heterogeneity parameter.
Hence measurement error, which prevents the identi￿cation of the MA process does not prevent
identi￿cation of the properties of the variance, so long as such error is classical.
The moments above are conditional on unobserved heterogeneity; to complete identi￿cation we
need to control for that. As the moment conditions demonstrate, estimating the parameters of the
variances is akin to estimating a dynamic panel data model with additive ￿xed e⁄ects. Typically
we should be guided in estimation by asymptotic arguments that rely on the number of individuals
tending to in￿nity and the number of time periods being ￿xed and relatively short.
One consistent approach to estimation would be to use ￿rst di⁄erences to eliminate the hetero-
geneity and then use instruments dated t ￿ 3 for the transitory shock and dated t ￿ q ￿ 4 for the
36In cases where the order of the MA process is greater than 1 the parameter ￿ that appears in 26 is the parameter
on the longest MA lag.




















where ￿xt = xt ￿ xt￿1: In practice, however, as Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) found out, lagged
instruments suggested above may be only very weakly correlated with the entities in the expecta-
tions above. This means that the rank condition for identi￿cation is not satis￿ed and consequently
the ARCH parameters may not be identi￿able through this approach. An alternative may be to
use a likelihood approach, which will exploit all the moments implied by the speci￿cation and
the distributional assumption; this however may be particularly complicated. A convenient ap-
proximation may be to use within groups on (26). This involves subtracting the individual mean
o⁄ each expression on the right hand side, i.e. just replace all expressions in (26) by quanti-




t=1 gi;a+q+1;t+q+1gi;a;t. Nickell (1981) and Nerlove (1971) have shown
that this estimator is inconsistent for ￿xed T: E⁄ectively this implies that the estimates may be
biased when T is short because the individual speci￿c mean may not satisfy the moment conditions
for short T: In practice this estimator will work well with long panel data. Meghir and Pistaferri
use individuals observed for at least 16 periods. E⁄ectively, while ARCH e⁄ects are likely to be
very important for understanding behavior, there is no doubt that they are di¢ cult to identify. A
likelihood based approach, although very complex may ultimately prove the best way forward.
Other approaches
3.1.5 A Summary of existing Studies
In this section we provide a summary of the key studies in the literature.37 Most of the information
is summarized in Table 3.1.5 but we also o⁄er a brief description of the key results of the papers
in the Table. Some of the earliest studies are those of Hause (1980) who was investigating the
37In the discussion of the literature we make primarily reference to US studies on males. See among others Dickens
(2000) for the UK, Cappellari (2004) for Italy, and Alvarez (2004) for Spain. There is little evidence on female
earnings dynamics, most likely because of the di¢ culty of modeling labor market participation (see Hyslop, 2001;
Voena, 2010).
37importance of on-the-job training and Lillard and Willis (1978) who were interested in earnings
mobility. Both ￿nd an important role for unobserved heterogeneity and conclude that the process
of income is stationary. Hause used the idea of heterogeneous income pro￿les, which later played a
central role in the debate in this literature.
Following these papers are two of the most important works in this literature, namely MaCurdy
(1982) and Abowd and Card (1989). Both use PSID data for ten years, but covering di⁄erent time
periods. Abowd and Card also use NLS data and data from an income maintenance experiment.
The emphasis on these papers is precisely to understand the time series properties of earnings
and extract information relating to the variance of the shocks. They both conclude that the best
representation of earnings is one with a unit root in levels and MA(2) in ￿rst di⁄erences. Abowd
and Card go further and also model the time series properties of hours of work jointly with earnings,
potentially extracting the extent to which earnings ￿ uctuations are due to hours ￿ uctuations. The
papers by Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2009) and Altonji, Viidangos and Smith (2009), which
explicitly make the distinction between shocks and endogenous responses to shocks, can be seen as
related to this work. Similar conclusions are reached by Topel and Ward (1992) using matched ￿rm-
worker administrative records spanning 16 years. They conclude that earnings are best described
by a random walk plus an i.i.d. error.
In an important paper Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1995) use the permanent transitory decomposi-
tion to ￿t data on earnings and to try to understand the relative importance of the change in the
permanent and transitory variance in explaining the changes in US inequality over the 1980s and
1990s. Their permanent component is de￿ned to be a random walk with a time varying variance.
The transitory component is an AR(1), also with time varying variance. Both variances were shown
to increase over time. They also consider a variety of other models including most importantly the
random growth model, where age is interacted with a ￿xed e⁄ect. As we have already explained,
this is an important alternative to the random walk model because they both explain the increase
in variance of earnings with age, but have fundamentally di⁄erent economic implications. In their
results the two models ￿t more or less equally well the data38. Based on earlier results by Abowd
38The ￿
2 for the random growth model is slightly larger than the one based on the model with the random walk.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































45and Card (1989), Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt choose the random walk model as their vehicle for analysis
of inequality and mobility patterns in the data.
Farber and Gibbons (1996) provide a structural interpretation of wage dynamics. The key
idea here is that ￿rm publicly learn the worker￿ s ability and at each point in time the wage is set
equal to the conditional expectation of workers￿productivity. Among other results this implies
that wage levels follow a martingale. The result is however fragile; for example if heterogeneous
returns to experience are allowed for the martingale result no longer holds. Their results indeed
reject the martingale hypothesis. The model is quite restrictive, because it does not allow for the
incumbent ￿rm to have superior information as in Acemoglu and Pischke (1998). Moreover, given
the speci￿cation in levels (rather than in logs), the relevance of this paper to the literature we are
discussing here is mainly because of its important attempt to o⁄er a structural interpretation to
wage dynamics rather than for its actual results.
Baker (1997) compares results of ￿tting the pro￿le heterogeneity model39 to the one where a
unit root is allowed for. He ￿ts the levels model to the level of autocovariances of log earnings.
When no pro￿le heterogeneity is allowed for the model displays a unit root. However, when
pro￿le heterogeneity is allowed for, the unit root becomes an autoregressive coe¢ cient of about
0.6. Thus clearly the unit root is required, when heterogeneity is not allowed for to explain the
long term persistence and presumably the increasing variance over the lifecycle. However, this can
be captured equally well by the pro￿le heterogeneity. As remarked by Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt and
Baker himself, the pro￿le heterogeneity model will imply autocovariances that are increasing with
the square of experience/age, in the way Baker speci￿ed it.40 However, Baker does not seem to
exploit this pattern because he ￿ts the autocovariance structure without conditioning on age or
potential experience. This may reduce the ability to reject the pro￿le heterogeneity model in favour
of the unit root one. Nevertheless, with his approach he ￿nds that both the unit root model and
the pro￿le heterogeneity model ￿t the data similarly. However, when estimating the encompassing
model, ui;a;t = hi + a ￿ fi + pi;a;t with pi;a;t = ￿pi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿i;a;t, ￿; the coe¢ cient on the AR
component is signi￿cantly lower than 1, rejecting the unit root hypothesis; moreover the variance
39By pro￿le heterogeneity he means that the residual in the earnings equation is hi + a ￿ fi + vi;a;t, where vi;a;t
may follow an MA or a stationary AR model. This model is also known as Heterogeneous Income Pro￿les (HIP).
40He used a ￿ fi: Other functional forms would imply di⁄erent patterns. Consider for example
p
a ￿ fi
46of fi is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. On the basis of this the best ￿tting model would be
heterogeneous income pro￿les with a reasonably persistent transitory shock. Nevertheless, there
still is a puzzle: the autocovariances of residual income growth of order higher than two are all
very small and individually insigni￿cant. Baker directly tests that these are indeed jointly zero
and despite the apparent insigni￿cance of all of them individually he rejects this hypothesis and
concludes that the evidence against the unit root and in favour of the pro￿le heterogeneity model is
strong. We suspect that his may be due to the way inference was carried out: Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004) also test that all autocovariances of order 3 or more are zero (in the PSID) and they accept
this with p ￿ value of 12%.41 Perhaps the reason for this di⁄erence with Baker is that Meghir
and Pistaferri use the block bootstrap, thus bypassing the problem of estimating the covariance
matrix of the second order moments using the fourth order ones and allowing for more general
serial correlation.
The unit root model is particularly attractive for understanding such phenomena as the increase
in the variance of consumption over the lifecycle, as originally documented by Deaton and Paxson
(1994); the fact that mobility in income exceed mobility in consumption (Jappelli and Pistaferri,
2006); and the fact that the consumption distribution is more lognormal than the income distribu-
tion (Battistin, Blundell and Lewbel, 2010). However, the heterogeneous income pro￿les model is
also attractive from the point of view of labour economics. It is well documented that returns to
education and experience tend to increase with ability indicators. Such ability indicators are either
unobserved in data sets used for studying earnings dynamics or are simply inadequate and not
used. There is no real reason why the two hypotheses should be competing and they are de￿nitely
not logically inconsistent with each other. Indeed a model with a unit root process and a transitory
component as well as a heterogeneous income pro￿le is identi￿able.
Speci￿cally, Baker and Solon (2003) estimate a model along the lines of the speci￿cation in
(21), which allows both for pro￿le heterogeneity and imposes a random walk on the permanent
component, as well as an AR(1) transitory one. Their rich model is estimated with a large Canadian
administrative data set. There is enough in their model to allow for the possibility of individual
components to be unimportant: thus for example the variance of the permanent shock could
41See note to table II in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
47be estimated to be zero, in which case the model would be one of pro￿le heterogeneity with an
autoregressive component, very much like in Baker (1997). Yet the variance of the permanent shock
is very precisely estimated and indeed quite large (0.007). Thus these authors ￿nd clear evidence
(on Canadian data) of both a permanent shock and of long run heterogeneity in the growth pro￿les.
Thinking of the permanent shocks as uncertainty and pro￿le heterogeneity as information known
by the individual at the start of life, their estimation provides an interesting balance between the
amount of wage variance due to uncertainty and that due to heterogeneity: on the one hand their
estimate is a quarter that of Meghir and Pistaferri (2004); on the other hand it is still substantial
from a welfare perspective and in terms of its implications for precautionary savings.
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) adopt the unit root model with MA transitory shocks and mea-
surement error, after testing the speci￿cation and ￿nding it acceptable. With their approach they
do not ￿nd evidence of pro￿le heterogeneity. They also allow for variances of the shocks to depend
on age, time and unobserved heterogeneity as well as ARCH e⁄ects. The latter are important
because they re￿ ect the volatility of uncertainty. In their model they thus allow heteroskedastic-
ity due to permanent heterogeneity to compete with the impact of volatility shocks. They ￿nd
very large ARCH e⁄ects both for the permanent and the transitory shock, implying large e⁄ects
on precautionary savings, over and above the e⁄ects due to the average variance of the shocks.
They also ￿nd strong evidence of permanent heterogeneity in variances. One interpretation is that
there is considerable uncertainty in income pro￿les, as expressed by the random walk, but there
is also widespread heterogeneity in the distributions from which the permanent and transitory in-
come shocks are drawn. Indeed this idea of heterogeneity was taken up by Alvarez, Browning and
Ejrnaes (2006) who estimate an income process with almost all aspects being individual-speci￿c.
They conclude that the nature of the income process varies across individuals, with some being
best characterized by a unit root in the process, while others by a stationary one.
Clearly the presence of a random walk in earnings is controversial and has led to a voluminous
amount of work. This is not because of some nerdy or pedantic ￿xation with the exact time
series speci￿cation of income but is due to the importance of this issue for asset accumulation and
welfare.42
42For example, if the income process was written as yia;;t = hi+a￿fi+"i;a;t, with "i;a;t being an i.i.d. error term,
consumption would respond very little to changes in income (unless consumers had to learn about fi and/or hi, see
48Guvenen (2009) compares what he calls a HIP (heterogeneous income pro￿les) income process
and a RIP (restricted income pro￿les) income process and their empirical implications. The income
process (in a simpli￿ed form) is as follows:
yi;a;t = X0
i;a;t￿t + hi + a ￿ fi + pi;a;t + dt"i;a;t
pi;a;t = ￿pi;a￿1;t￿1 + ’t￿i;a;t
with an initial condition equal to 0.
The estimation strategy is based on minimizing the ￿distance￿ between the elements of the
(T ￿T) empirical covariance matrix of income residuals in levels and its counterpart implied by the
model described above (where income residuals ^ yi;a;t are obtained regressing yi;a;t on X0
i;a;t).43 The
main ￿ndings are as follows. First, mis-speci￿cation of a HIP process as a RIP process results in a
biased estimation of the persistence parameter ￿ and an overestimation of ￿2
". The estimates of ￿
are much smaller for HIP (￿ = 0:82) compared to RIP (￿ = 0:99 - insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from 1).





is signi￿cant. This dispersion
is higher for more educated groups. Finally, 65 to 80 percent of income inequality at the age of
retirement is due to heterogeneous pro￿les.
Hryshko (2009) in an important paper sets out to resolve the random walk vs. stochastic growth
process controversy by carrying out Monte Carlo simulations and empirical analysis on PSID data.
First, he generates data based on a process with a random walk and persistent transitory shocks.
He then ￿ts a (misspeci￿ed) model assuming heterogenous age pro￿les and an AR(1) component
and ￿nds that the estimated persistence of the AR component is biased downwards and that there
is evidence for heterogeneous age pro￿le. In the empirical data he ￿nds that the model with
the random walk cannot be rejected, while he ￿nds little evidence in support of the model with
heterogeneous growth rates. While these results are probably not going to be viewed as conclusive,
what is clear is that the encompassing model of, say, Baker (1997) may not be a reliable way of
Guveven ,2007).
43The main problem when using the autocovariances is that because of sample attrition, fewer and fewer individuals
contribute to the higher autocovariances, raising concerns about potential selectivity bias. Using also consumption
data would help overcoming this problem since consumption is forward looking by nature, see Guvenen and Smith
(2009).
49testing the competing hypotheses. It also shows that the evidence for the random walk is indeed
very strong and reinforces the results by Baker and Solon (2003), which support the presence of a
unit root as well as heterogeneous income pro￿les.
Most approaches described above have been based on quite parsimonious time series represen-
tations. However three papers stand out for their attempt to model the process in a richer fashion:
Geweke and Keane (2000) and Chamberlain and Hirano (1999) use a Bayesian approach and allow
for more complex dynamics and the latter for heterogeneity in the dynamics of income; Browning,
Ejrnaes and Alvarez (2006) emphasize the importance of heterogeneity even more. Speci￿cally:
Geweke and Keane (2000) follow a Bayesian approach to model lifecycle earnings based on the
PSID, with the primary motivation of understanding income mobility and to improve the ￿t vis-￿-
vis earlier mobility studies, such as the one by Lillard and Willis (1978). Their modelling approach
is very ￿ exible, allowing for lagged income, serially correlated shocks and permanent unobserved
characteristics. They ￿nd that at any point in time about 60-70% of the variance in earnings is
accounted for by transitory shocks that average out over the lifecycle. But the result they empha-
size most is the fact that the shocks are not normal and that allowing for departure from normal
heteroskedastic shocks is crucial for ￿tting the data. In this respect their results are similar to those
of Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), who allow for ARCH e⁄ects. Nevertheless, the interpretation of
the two models is di⁄erent, because of the dynamics in the variance allowed by the latter.
Similar to Geweke and Keane, Chamberlain and Hirano (1999) also use a Bayesian approach to
estimate predictive distributions of earnings, given past histories; they also use data from the PSID.
They motivate their paper explicitly by thinking of an individual who has to predict future income
when making consumption plans. The main di⁄erence of their approach from that of Geweke
and Keane is that they allow for heteroskedastic innovations to income and heterogeneity in the
dynamics of earnings. They ￿nd that the shock process has a unit root when the serial correlation
coe¢ cient is constrained to be one for all individuals. When it is allowed to be heterogeneous
it is centred around 0.97 with a population standard deviation of 0.07, which implies about half
individuals having a unit root in their process.
Browning, Ejrnaes and Alvarez (2006) extend this idea further by allowing the entire income
process to be heterogeneous. Their model allows for all parameters of the income process to be
50di⁄erent across individuals, including a heterogeneous income pro￿le and a heterogeneous serial
correlation coe¢ cient restricted to be in the open interval (0,1). This stable model is then mixed
with a unit root model, with some mixing probability estimated from the data. This then implies
that with some probability an individual faces an income process with a unit root; alternatively
the process is stable with heterogenous coe¢ cients. They estimate their model using the same
PSID data as Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and ￿nd that the median AR(1) coe¢ cient is 0.8, with
a proportion of individuals (about 30%) having an AR(1) coe¢ cient over 0.9. They attribute their
result to the fact that they have decoupled the serial correlation properties of the shocks from the
speed of convergence to some long run mean, which is governed by a di⁄erent coe¢ cient.
Beyond the controversy on the nature of the income process (but not unrelated), a newer
literature has emerged, where the sources of uncertainty are distinguished in a more structural
fashion. We discuss these papers and other related contributions in Section 5.
4 Using Choices to Learn About Risk
In this section we discuss papers that use consumption and income data jointly. Traditionally, this
was done for testing the implications of the life cycle permanent income hypothesis, for example
the main proposition that consumption responds strongly to permanent income and very little to
transitory income. In this traditional view, the income process was taken as given and it was
assumed that the individual had the same amount of information than the econometrician. In
this approach, the issue of interest was insurance (or more properly "smoothing") not information.
More recently, a number of papers have argued that consumption and income data jointly can be
used to measure the extent of risk faced by households and understand its nature. This approach
starts from the consideration that the use of income data alone is unlikely to be conclusive about
the extent of risk that people face. The idea is to use actual individual choices (such as consump-
tion, labor supply, human capital investment decisions) to infer the amount of risk that people face.
This is because, assuming consumers behave rationally, their actual choices will re￿ ect the amount
of risk that they face. Among the papers pursuing this idea, Blundell and Preston (1995), and
Heckman et al. (2006) deserve a special mention. As correctly put by Cunha and Heckman (2007),
￿purely statistical decompositions cannot distinguish uncertainty from other sources of variability.
51Transitory components as measured by a statistical decomposition may be perfectly predictable by
agents, partially predictable or totally unpredictable." Another reason why using forward looking
￿choices￿ allows us to learn about features of the earnings process is that consumption choices
should re￿ ect the nature of income changes. For example, if we were to observe a large consump-
tion response to a given income change, we could infer that the income change is unanticipated
and persistent (Blundell and Preston, 1995; Guvenen and Smith, 2009). We discuss these two
approaches, together with notable contributions, in turn.
4.1 Approach 1: Identifying insurance for a given information set
Using joint data on consumption and income to estimate the impact of income on consumption has a
long tradition in economics. Following Friedman (1957), many researchers have used consumption
and income data (both aggregate data and household data) to test the main implication of the
theory, namely that consumption is strongly related to permanent income and not much related
to current or transitory income. Papers that do this include Liviatan (1963), Bhalla (1979,1980),
Musgrove (1979), Att￿eld (1976, 1980), Mayer (1972), Klein and Liviatan (1957), Kreinin (1961).
Later contributions include Sargent (1978), Wolpin (1982) and Paxson (1992).
Most papers propose a statistical representation of the following type:
Y = Y P + Y T
C = CP + CT
Y P = XP￿P + ￿
Y T = XT￿T + "
CP = ￿PY P
CT = ￿TY T + ￿
in which Y (C) is current income (consumption), divided in permanent Y P (CP) and transitory
Y T (CT). The main objective of most papers is to estimate ￿P, test whether ￿P > ￿T, and or/test
whether ￿P = 1 (the income proportionality hypothesis). The earlier contributions (Bhalla, 1979;
Musgrove, 1979) write a model for Y P directly as a function of observables (such as education,
52occupation, industry, etc.). In contrast, Sargent (1977) and Wolpin (1982) use the restrictions on
the theory imposed by the rational expectations framework. An important paper in this respect is
Hall and Mishkin (1982).
4.1.1 Hall and Mishkin (1982)
The authors in the papers above do not write explicitly the stochastic structure of income. For
example, in the statistical characterization above permanent income is literally permanent (a ￿xed
e⁄ect). The ￿rst paper to use micro panel data to decompose income shocks into permanent and
transitory components writing an explicit stochastic income process is Hall and Mishkin (1982),
who investigate whether households follow the rational expectations formulation of the perma-
nent income hypothesis using PSID data on income and food consumption. Their setup assumes
quadratic preferences (and hence looks at consumption and income changes), imposes that the
marginal propensity to consume with respect to permanent shocks is 1, and leaves only the MPC
with respect to transitory shocks free for estimation.
The income process is described by equations (3) and (4) (enriched to allow for some serial
correlation of the MA type in the transitory component), so that the change in consumption is
given by equation (5):
￿ci;a;t = ￿i;a;t + ￿a"i;a;t
Since the PSID has information only on food consumption, this equation is recast in terms of
food spending (implicitly assuming separability between food and other non-durable goods):
￿cF
i;a;t = ￿(￿i;a;t + ￿a"i;a;t) + ￿mF
i;a;t
where ￿ is the proportion of income spent of food, and mF is a stochastic element added to food
consumption (measurement error), not correlated with the random elements of income (￿i;a;t and
"i;a;t). The model is estimated using maximum likelihood assuming that all the random elements
are normally distributed.
Hall and Mishkin (1982) also allow for the possibility that the consumer has some "advance
53information" (relative to the econometrician) about the income process.44 Calling ￿ the degree of
advance information, they rewrite their model as:
￿cF
i;a;t = ￿￿(￿i;a+1;t+1 + ￿a+1"i;a+1;t+1) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿i;a;t + ￿a"i;a;t) + ￿mF
i;a;t (28)
Their estimates of (28) only partly con￿rm the PIH. Their estimates of ￿ is 0.25 and their
estimate of ￿ (which they assume to be constant over the life cycle) is 0.29, too high to be consistent
with plausible interest rates. They reconcile this result with the possibility of excess sensitivity.
They note that, contrary to the theory￿ s prediction, cov(￿ca;￿ya￿1) 6= 0. Hall and Mishkin suggest
a set up where a fraction ￿ of the households overreact to changes in transitory income rather than
follow the permanent income. Estimating this model, the authors ￿nd that approximately 20
percent of consumers do not follow the permanent income hypothesis.45
4.2 Approach 2: Identifying information set for given insurance con￿guration
Why can consumption and income data be useful in identifying information set or learn more about
the nature of the income process? To see very clearly this point, consider a simple extension of an
example used by Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999). Certain features of the income process
are not identi￿able using income data alone. However, we might learn about them using jointly
income and consumption data (or even labor supply, or more generally any choice that is a⁄ected by
income). Assume that the income process is given by the sum of a random walk (pi;a;t), a transitory
shock ("i;a;t) and a measurement error (mi;a;t, which may even re￿ ect ￿superior information￿ , i.e.,
information that is observed by the individual but not by an econometrician):
yi;a;t = pi;a;t + "i;a;t + mi;a;t
pi;a;t = pi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿i;a;t
Written in ￿rst di⁄erences, this becomes
44There are two possible interpretation for ￿ > 0. First, the consumer has better information than the econo-
metrician regarding future income. Second, the timing of income and consumption information in the PSID is not
synchronized. Interviews typically are conducted at the end of the ￿rst quarter. Income refers to the previous calen-
dar, while consumption may possibly refer to the time of the interview, which may mean that the consumer chooses
his consumption at age a after having observed at least 1/4 of his income at age a + 1.
45Altonji, Martins and Siow (2002) extend Hall and Mishkin￿ s model in a number of directions.
54￿yi;a;t = ￿i;a;t + ￿"i;a;t + ￿mi;a;t
As discussed in Section 3, one cannot separately identify transitory shocks and measurement
error (unless access to validation data gives us an estimate of the amount of variability explained by
measurement error, as in Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004; or higher order restrictions are invoked, as in
Cragg, 1997; or assumptions about separate serial correlation of the two components are imposed).
Assume as usual that preferences are quadratic, ￿ (1 + r) = 1 and that the consumer￿ s horizon is
in￿nite for simplicity. The change in consumption is given by equation (5) adapted to the in￿nite
horizon case:




The component mi;a;t does not enter (29) because consumption does not respond to measurement
error in income. However, if mi;a;t represented "superior information", then this assumption would
have behavioral content: it would be violated if liquidity constraints were binding - and hence mi;a;t
would belong to (29).
Suppose a researcher has access to panel data on consumption and income (a very stringent























As is clear from the ￿rst two moments, ￿2
" and ￿2
m cannot be told apart from income data
46Surprisingly, neither the US nor the UK have a data set with panel data on both income and a comprehensive
measure of consumption. In the US, for example, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) contains longitudinal
income data, but the information on consumption is scanty (limited to food and few more items, although since 1999
the amount of information on consumption has increased substantially). The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
is a rotating panel that follows households for at most four quarters. Leaving aside the complicated details of the
sampling frame, there is basically only one observations on annual consumption and two (overlapping) observations
on income. Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) have used an imputation procedure to create panel data on income
and consumption in the PSID. As far as we know, only the Italian SHIW and the Russia LMS provide panel data
on both income and consumption (although the panel samples are not large). The SHIW panel data have been used
by Pistaferri (2001), ?, ?, and recently by Krueger and Perri (2009) and Kaufmann and Pistaferri (2009) to study
some of the issues discussed in this chapter. See Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova and Stolyarov (2010) for details on the
RLMS.
55alone (although the variance of permanent shocks can actually be identi￿ed - e.g., using ￿2
￿ =
var(￿yi;a;t) + 2cov (￿yi;a;t;￿yi;a￿1;t￿1), the stationary version of equation (17) above). However,
the availability of consumption data solves the identi￿cation problem. In particular, one could







[var(￿ci;a;t) ￿ var(￿yi;a;t) ￿ 2cov (￿yi;a;t;￿yi;a￿1;t￿1)] (30)
Note also that if one is willing to use the covariance between changes in consumption and







"), then there is even an overidentifying
restriction that can be used to test the model.
It is useful at this point to separate the literature into two sub-branches - those devoted to
learning features of the income process, and those devoted to identifying information set.
4.2.1 Is the increase in income inequality permanent or transitory?
Blundell and Preston (1998) use the link between the income process and consumption inequality
to understand the nature and causes of the increase in inequality of consumption and the relative
importance of changes in the variance of transitory and permanent shocks. Their motivation is
that they have only repeated cross-section data, and the variances of income shocks are changing
over time due to, for example, rising inequality. Hence for a given cohort, say, and even ignoring
measurement error one has:








where j = 0 corresponds to the age of entry of this cohort in the labor market. With repeated






Hence, a rise in inequality (the left-hand side of this equation) may be due to a rise in "volatility"




. In repeated cross-
sections the problem of distinguishing between the two sources is unsolvable if one focuses just
on income data. Suppose instead one has access to repeated cross-section data on consumption
56(which, conveniently, may or may not come from the same data set - the use of multiple data set is
possible as long as samples are drawn randomly from the same underlying population). Then we











assuming one can approximate the variance of the change with the change of the variances (see
Deaton and Paxson, 1994, for a discussion of the conditions under which this approximation is
acceptable). Here one can see that the growth in consumption inequality is dominated by the
permanent component (for small r the second term on the right hand side vanishes). Indeed,
assuming r ￿ 0, we have that the change in consumption inequality identi￿es the variance of the
permanent component and that the di⁄erence between the change in income inequality and the
change in consumption inequality identi￿es the change in the variance of the transitory shock.47
However, the possibility of partial insurance, serially correlated shocks, measurement error, lack of
cross-sectional orthogonality may generate underidenti￿cation.
Related to Blundell and Preston (1998) is a paper by Hryshko (2008). He estimates jointly
a consumption function (based on the CRRA speci￿cation) and an income process. Based on
the evidence from Hryshko (2009) and the literature, as well as the need to match the increasing
inequality of consumption over the lifecycle, he assumes that the income process is the sum of
a random walk and a transitory shock. However, he also allows the structural shocks (i.e. the
transitory shock and the innovation to the permanent component) to be correlated. In simulations
he shows that such a correlation can be very important for interpreting lifecycle consumption. This
additional feature cannot be identi￿ed without its implications for consumption and thus provides
an excellent example of the joint identifying power of the two processes (income and consumption).
He then estimates jointly the income and consumption process using simulated methods of moment.
In addition, just like Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) he estimates the proportion of the
permanent and the transitory shock that are insured ￿nding that 37% of permanent shocks are
insured via channels other than savings; transitory shocks are only insured via savings.
47Using information on the change in the covariance between consumption and income one gets an overidentifying
restriction that as before can be used to test the model.
574.2.2 Identifying Information Set
Now we discuss three examples where the idea of jointly using consumption and income data has
been used to identify information set of individuals.
Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005) The authors estimate what components of measured
lifetime income variability are due to uncertainty realized after their college decision time, and
what components are due to heterogeneity (known at the time the decision is made). The identi￿-
cation strategy depends on the speci￿cation of preferences and on the assumptions made about the
structure of markets. In their paper markets are complete. The goal is to identify the distributions
of predictable heterogeneity and uncertainty separately. The authors ￿nd that about half of the
variance of unobservable components in the returns to schooling are known and acted on by the
agents when making schooling choices. The framework of their paper has been extended in Cunha
and Heckman (2007), where the authors show that a large fraction of the increase in inequality in
recent years is due to the increase in the variance of the unforecastable components. In particular,
they estimate the fraction of future earnings that is forecastable and how this fraction has changed
over time using college decision choices. For less skilled workers, roughly 60% of the increase in
wage variability is due to uncertainty. For more skilled workers, only 8% of the increase in wage
variability is due to uncertainty.
The following simpli￿ed example demonstrates their identi￿cation strategy in the context of
consumption choices. Suppose as usual that preferences are quadratic, ￿ (1 + r) = 1, initial assets















i;a+1;t+1￿ is observed by both the individual and the econometrician, ￿A
i;a+1;t+1 is potentially
observed only by the individual, and ￿U
i;a+1;t+1 is unobserved to both. The idea is that one can
58form the following "deviation" variables
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6= 0, there is evidence of "superior information", i.e., the consumer used
more than just X0
i;a+1;t+1￿ to decide how much to consume in period t.
Primiceri and Van Rens (2009) Primiceri and van Rens (2009) assume that consumers are
unable to smooth permanent shocks, and that any attenuated response measures the amount of
advance information that they have about developments in their (permanent) income. Using CEX
data, they ￿nd that all of the increase in income inequality over the 1980-2000 period can be at-
tributed to an increase in the variance of permanent shocks but that most of the permanent income
shocks are anticipated by individuals; hence consumption inequality remains ￿ at even though in-
come inequality increases. While their results challenge the common view that permanent shocks
were important only in the early 1980s (see Card and Di Nardo, 2002; Mo¢ tt and Gootschalk,
2000), they could be explained by the poor quality of income data in the CEX (see Heathcote,
Storesletten and Violante, 2009).
The authors decompose idiosyncratic changes in income into predictable and unpredictable
permanent income shocks and to transitory shocks. They estimate the contribution of each element
to total income inequality using CEX data. The log income process is speci￿ed as follows
yi;a;t = pi;a;t + "i;a;t (31)
pi;a;t = pi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿U
i;a;t + ￿A
i;a;t (32)
where "i;a;t and ￿U
i;a;t are unpredictable to the individual and ￿A
i;a;t is predictable to the individual
but unobservable to the econometrician. Using CRRA utility with incomplete markets (there is
only a risk free bond) log consumption can be shown to follow (approximately):
ci;a;t = ci;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿U
i;a;t (33)
59From equations (31), (32) and (33), the following cohort-speci￿c moment conditions are implied:
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1;:::;T and vart (") for t = 0;:::;T. The authors estimate the model using a Bayesian likelihood
based approach evaluating the posterior using the MCMC algorithm. They ￿nd that predictable
permanent income shocks are the main source of income inequality.
The model above cannot distinguish between predictable permanent shocks and risk sharing.
To address this issue, the authors argue that if consumption does not respond to income shocks
because of risk sharing, we would expect part of that risk sharing to happen through taxes and
transfers and part through markets for ￿nancial assets. They show that re-estimating the model
for income before taxes, income before taxes excluding ￿nancial income and for earned income
before tax and transfers yields very close estimates to the baseline model (see Heathcote, 2010, for
a discussion of their testing strategy).
Guvenen (2006) and Guvenen and Smith (2009) In Guvenen￿ s (2007) model, income data
are generated by the heterogeneous income pro￿le speci￿cation. However, individuals do not know
the parameters of their own pro￿le (in particular, they ignore the slope of life-cycle pro￿le fi and
the value of the persistent component) and need to learn about them, using Bayesian updating, by
observing successive income realizations, which are noisy because of the mean reverting transitory
shock. He shows that this model can be made to ￿t the consumption data very well (both in terms
of levels and variance over the lifecycle) and in some ways better than the process that includes a
unit root. By introducing learning, Guveven relaxes the restriction linking the income process to
consumption and as a result weakens the identifying information implied by this link. This allows
the income process to be stationary and consumption to behave as if income is not stationary.
Thus, from a welfare point of view the individual is facing essentially as much uncertainty as they
60would under the random walk model, which is why the model can ￿t the increasing inequality
over the lifecycle. In Guvenen￿ s model it is just the interpretation of the nature of uncertainty
that has changed. The fact that the income process conditional on the individual is basically
deterministic (except for the small transitory shock) has lost its key welfare implications. Thus
whether the income is highly uncertain or deterministic becomes irrelevant for issues that have to
do with insurance and precautionary savings: individuals perceive it as highly uncertain and this
is all that matters.48
While Guvenen (2007) calibrates the consumption pro￿le, Guvenen and Smith (2009) use con-
sumption data jointly with income data to estimate the structural parameters of the model. They
extend the consumption imputation procedure of Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) to create
a panel data of income and consumption data in the PSID. As in Guvenen (2007), they assume
that the income process is the sum of a random trend consumers must learn about in Bayesian
fashion, an AR(1) process with AR coe¢ cient below 1, and a serially uncorrelated component.
The authors estimate the structural parameters of their model applying an indirect inference
approach - a simulation based approach suitable for models in which it is very di¢ cult to specify
the criterion function.49 The authors de￿ne an auxiliary model in which consumption and income
depend on lags and leads of consumption and income, as well as growth rates of income at various
lags and leads. For their estimation, the authors construct the panel of imputed household con-
sumption by combining data from the PSID and CEX. As in Guvenen (2009) the authors ￿nd that
income shocks are less persistent in the HIP case (￿ = 0:76) than in the RIP case (￿ close to one),
and that there is a signi￿cant evidence for heterogeneity in income growth. In addition, they ￿nd
that prior uncertainty is quite small (￿ = 0:19, meaning that about 80 percent of the uncertainty
about the random trend component is resolved in the ￿rst period of life). They therefore argue that
the amount of uninsurable lifetime income risk that households perceive is smaller than what is
typically assumed in calibrated macroeconomic models. Statistically speaking, the estimate is very
48Guvenen￿ s characterization of the stochastic income process is appealing because consistent, in a "reduced form"
sense, with the human capital model (Ben-Porath, 1967). We say in a "reduced form" sense because in his framework
age or potential experience are used in lieu of actual experience, thus sidestepping the thorny issue of endogenous
employment decisions (see Huggett, Ventura and Yaron, 2007).
49The main di⁄erence from Guvenen (2009) is that the present paper estimates all the structural parameters jointly
using income and consumption data (whereas in the 2007 paper income process parameters were estimated using
only income data and preference parameters were taken from other studies in the literature).
61imprecise and one could conclude that everything about the random trend term is known early on
in the life cycle.
4.3 Information or Insurance?
In the three examples above it is possible to solve the identi￿cation problem by making the following
assumptions. First, consumption responds to signal, not to noise. In a related way, consumption
responds to unanticipated, not to forecastable changes in income. While the orthogonality of
consumption to measurement error in income is not implausible, the orthogonality to anticipated
changes in income has behavioral content. Households will respond to anticipated changes in
income, causing the theory to fail, if there are intertemporal distortions induced by, e.g. liquidity
constraints.50
Second, the structure of markets is such that the econometrician can predict response of con-
sumption to income shocks on the basis of a model of individual behavior. For example, in the
strict version of the PIH with in￿nite horizon, the marginal propensity to consume out of perma-
nent shock is 1 and the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory shock is equal to the
annuity value r
1+r.51 That is, one identi￿es the variances of interest only under the assumption
that the chosen model of behavior describes the data accurately.
But what if there is more insurance than predicted by, for example, the simple PIH version of the
theory? There are alternative theories that predict that consumers may insure their income shocks
to a larger extent than predicted by a simple model with just self-insurance through a risk-free bond.
One example is the full insurance model. Clearly, it is hard to believe full insurance is literally
true. The model has obvious theoretical problems: private information, limited enforcement, etc.
And there are of course also empirical problems: The full insurance hypothesis is soundly rejected
(Cochrane, 1991; Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotliko⁄, 1996).
But outside the extreme case of the full insurance model, there is perhaps more insurance than
predicted by the strict PIH version with just a risk-free bond. In section 2.2.2, we have seen
that standard Bewley-type models can generate some insurance even of permanent shocks as long
50The e⁄ect is asymmetric: Liquidity constraints should matter only for anticipated income increases (where the
optimal response would be to borrow), but not for anticipated income declines (where the optimal response would
be to save, which is not limited - unless storage technologies are missing).
51Another implicit assumption, of course, is that the theory is correct.
62as people accumulate some precautionary wealth. To achieve this result, one does not require
sophisticated contingent Arrow-Debreu markets. All is needed is a simple storage technology (such
as a saving account).
A recent macroeconomic literature has explored a number of theoretical alternatives to the
insurance con￿gurations described above. These alternative models fall under two broad groups:
those that assume public information but limited enforcement of contracts, and those that as-
sume full commitment but private information. These models prove that the self-insurance case
is Pareto-ine¢ cient even conditioning on limited enforcement and private information issues. In
both types of models, agents typically achieve more insurance than under a model with a single
non-contingent bond, but less than under a complete markets environment. These models show
that the relationship between income shocks and consumption depends on the degree of persistence
of income shocks. Alvarez and Jermann (2000), for example, explore the nature of income insurance
schemes in economies where agents cannot be prevented from withdrawing participation if the loss
from the accumulated future income gains they are asked to forgo becomes greater than the gains
from continuing participation. Such schemes, if feasible, allow individuals to keep some of the pos-
itive shocks to their income and therefore o⁄er only partial income insurance. If income shocks are
persistent enough and agents are in￿nitely lived, then participation constraints become so severe
that no insurance scheme is feasible. With ￿nite lived agents, the future bene￿ts from a positive
permanent shock exceed those from a comparable transitory shock. This suggests that the degree
of insurance should be allowed to di⁄er between transitory and permanent shocks and should also
be allowed to change over time and across di⁄erent groups. Krueger and Perri (2006) provide an
empirical review of income and consumption inequality in the 80￿ s and 90￿ s. They then suggest
a theoretical macro model based on self insurance with limited commitment trying to explain the
moderate expansion in consumption inequality compared to income inequality.Their hypothesis is
that an increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic labour income has not only been an important
factor in the increase in income inequality, but has also caused a change in the development of
￿nancial markets, allowing individual households to better insure against the bigger idiosyncratic
income ￿ uctuations.
Another reason for partial insurance is moral hazard. This is the direction taken in Attanasio
63and Pavoni (2009). Here the economic environment is characterized by moral hazard and hidden
asset accumulation, e.g., individuals have hidden access to a simple credit market. The authors
show that, depending on the cost of shirking and the persistence of the income shock, some partial
insurance is possible and a linear insurance rule can be obtained as an exact (closed form) solution
in a dynamic Mirrlees model with CRRA utility. In particular, the response of consumption to
permanent income shocks can be interpreted as a measure of the severity of informational problems.
Their empirical analysis ￿nds evidence for ￿excess smoothness" of consumption with respect to
permanent shocks. However, they show that the Euler equation for consumption is still valid and
that the empirical content of the model lies in how consumption reacts to unexpected income
shocks.
We now want to provide a simple example of the identi￿cation issue: is the attenuated response
of consumption to income shocks re￿ ecting ￿insurance/smoothing￿or ￿information￿ ? Assume that
log income and log consumption changes are given by the following equations:52





In this case, income shifts because of anticipated permanent changes in income (a pre-announced
promotion) and unanticipated permanent changes in income. In theory, consumption changes only
in response to the unanticipated component. Suppose that our objective is to estimate the extent







A possible way of identifying this parameter is to run a simple IV regression of ￿ci;a;t onto ￿yi;a;t
using (￿yi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿yi;a;t + ￿yi;a+1;t+1) as an instrument (see Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi,
2005). This yields indeed:
cov (￿ci;a;t;￿yi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿yi;a;t + ￿yi;a+1;t+1)








52Assuming for simplicity no news between period t ￿ 1 and period t about the path of ￿
A
i;a+j;t+j (j ￿ 0).
64Suppose now that ￿2
￿A = 0 (no advance or superior information), but there is some insurance
against permanent and transitory shocks, measured by the partial insurance parameters ￿ and ￿.
What is the IV regression above identifying? The model now is
￿yi;a;t = ￿U
i;a;t + ￿"i;a;t (34)
￿ci;a;t = ￿￿U
i;a;t + ￿"i;a;t (35)
and the IV parameter takes the form
cov (￿ci;a;t;￿yi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿yi;a;t + ￿yi;a+1;t+1)







which is what Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) assume.
Hence, the same moment
cov(￿ci;a;t;￿yi;a￿1;t￿1+￿yi;a;t+￿yi;a+1;t+1)
cov(￿yi;a;t;￿yi;a￿1;t￿1+￿yi;a;t+￿yi;a+1;t+1) has two entirely di⁄erent inter-
pretations depending on what assumptions one makes about information and insurance. What if
we have both an anticipated component and partial insurance? It￿ s easy to show that in this case
cov (￿ci;a;t;￿yi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿yi;a;t + ￿yi;a+1;t+1)
cov (￿yi;a;t;￿yi;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿yi;a;t + ￿yi;a+1;t+1)
= ￿￿
a combination of information and insurance.
In sum, suppose that a researcher ￿nds that consumption responds very little to what the
econometrician de￿nes to be a shock to economic resources (for the moment, neglect the distinction
between transitory and permanent shocks). There are at least two economically interesting reasons
why this might be the case. First, it is possible that what the econometrician de￿nes to be a shock
is not, in fact, a shock at all when seen from the point of view of the individual. In other words, the
change in economic resources identi￿ed by the econometrician as an innovation might be predicted
in advance (at least partly) by the consumer. Hence if the consumer is rational and not subject to
borrowing constraints, her consumption will not respond to changes in income that are anticipated.
It follows that the "extent of attenuation" of consumption in response to income shocks measures
the extent of "superior information" that the consumers possess.
The other possibility is that what the econometrician de￿nes to be a shock is correctly a shock
when seen from the point of view of the individual. However, suppose that the consumer has ac-
65cess to insurance mechanisms over and above self-insurance (for example, government insurance,
intergenerational transfers. etc.). Hence, consumption will react little to the shock (or less than
predicted by a model with just self-insurance). In this case, the "extent of attenuation" of consump-
tion in response to income shocks measures the extent of "partial insurance" that the consumers
has available against income shocks.53
More broadly, identi￿cation of information set requires taking a stand on the structure of (formal
and informal) credit and insurance markets. What looks like lack of information may be liquidity
constraints in disguise (consumer responds too much to negative transitory shock, say). What looks
like superior information may be insurance in disguise (consumer responds too little to permanent
shocks).
4.4 Approaching the information/insurance conundrum
The literature has considered two approaches to solve the information/insurance identi￿cation
issue. A ￿rst method attempts to identify episodes in which income changes unexpectedly, and
to evaluate in a quasi-experimental setting how consumption reacts to such changes. A second
approach estimates the impact of shocks combining realizations and expectations of income or
consumption in surveys where data on subjective expectations are available (see Hayashi, 1985,
and Pistaferri, 2001, for means, and Kaufmann and Pistaferri, 2009, for covariance restrictions).
Each of these approaches has pros and cons, as we shall discuss below. Before discussing
these approaches, we discuss Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) (BPP), which does impose
assumptions about the information set(s) of the agents and estimates insurance, but provides a
test of "superior information".
4.4.1 Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008)
The consumption model considered in Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) is given by equation
(12), while their income process is given by (10) and (11). In their study they create panel data
on a comprehensive consumption measure for the PSID using an imputation procedure based
on food demand estimates from the CEX. Table 4.4.1 reproduces their main results. They ￿nd
53A confounding issue is the possibility that the availability of public insurance displaces self-insurance or creates
disincentives to save because of asset testing (see Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1998).
66that consumption is nearly insensitive to transitory shocks (the estimated coe¢ cient is around 5
percent, but higher among poor households), while their estimate of the response of consumption to
permanent shocks is signi￿cantly lower than 1 (around 0.65, but lower for the college educated and
those near retirement and higher for poor or less educated households), suggesting that households
are able to insure at least part of the permanent shocks.
These results show (a) that the estimates of the insurance coe¢ cients in the baseline case are
statistically consistent with the values predicted by the calibrated Kaplan-Violante model of section
2.2.2.; (b) that younger cohorts have harder time smoothing their shocks, presumably because of
the lack of su¢ cient wealth; (c) groups with actual or presumed low wealth are not able to insure
permanent shocks (as expected from the model) and have even di¢ culties smoothing transitory
shocks (credit markets can be not available for people with little or no collateral).
While the setting of Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) cannot be used to distinguish
between insurance and information, their paper provides a test of their assumption about richness
of the information set. In particular, they follow Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005) and test
whether unexpected consumption growth (de￿ned as the residual of a regression of consumption
growth on observable household characteristics) is correlated with future income changes (de￿ned
also as the residual of a regression of income growth on observable household characteristics). If it
was the case, then consumption contains more information than used by the econometrician. Their
test of superior information reported in Table 4.4.1 shows that consumption is not correlated with
future income changes.
BPP ￿nd little evidence of anticipation. This suggests the persistent labour income shocks that
were experienced in the 1980s were not anticipated. These were largely changes in the returns to
skills, shifts in government transfers and the shift of insurance from ￿rms to workers.
Finally, the results of Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) can be used to understand why
consumption inequality in the US has grown less than income inequality during the past two
67Table 3: Partial Insurance Estimates from Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008)
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Table 4: Test of Superior Information, from Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008)
Test cov (￿ya+1;￿ca) for all a p-value 0.25
Test cov (￿ya+2;￿ca) for all a p-value 0.27
Test cov (￿ya+3;￿ca) for all a p-value 0.74
Test cov (￿ya+4;￿ca) for all a p-value 0.68
decades. Their ￿ndings suggest that the widening gap between consumption and income inequality
is due to the change in the durability of income shocks. In particular, a growth in the variance
of permanent shocks in the early eighties was replaced by a continued growth in the variance of
transitory income shocks in the late eighties. Since they ￿nd little evidence that the degree of
insurance with respect to shocks of di⁄erent durability changes over this period, it is the relative
increase in the variability of more insurable shocks rather than greater insurance opportunities that
explains the disjuncture between income and consumption inequality.
4.4.2 Solution 1: The quasi-experimental approach
The approach we discuss in this section does not require estimation of an income process, or even
observing the individual shocks.54 Rather, it compares households that are exposed to shocks with
households that are not (or the same households before and after the shock), and assumes that
the di⁄erence in consumption arise from the realization of the shocks. The idea here is to identify
episodes in which changes in income are unanticipated, easy to characterize (i.e., persistent or
transient), and (possibly) large.
The ￿rst of such attempts dates back to a study by Bodkin (1959), who laid down ￿fty years ago
all the ingredients of the quasi-experimental approach.55 In this pioneering study the experiment
54This section draws from Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010).
55As reported by Chao (2007), it was Friedman himself, in his Theory of the Consumption Function (1957, p. 215)
to suggest using this quasi-experimental variation to test the main predictions of the PIH. In the words of Friedman,
it provided a ￿controlled experiment￿of consumption behavior.
68consists of looking at the consumption behavior of WWII veterans after the receipt of unexpected
dividend payments from the National Service Life Insurance. Bodkin assumes that the dividend
payments are unanticipated and represent a windfall source of income, and ￿nds a point estimate
of the marginal propensity to consume non-durables out of this windfall income is as high as 0.72,
a strong violation of the permanent income model.56
The subsequent literature has looked at the economic consequences of illness (Gertler and
Gruber, 2002), disability (Stephens, 2001; Meyer and Mok, 2006), unemployment (Gruber, 1997;
Browning and Crossley, 2001), and, in the context of developing countries, weather shocks (Wolpin,
1982; Paxson, 1993) and crop losses (Cameron and Worswick, 2003). Some of these shocks are
transitory (i.e. temporary job loss), and others are permanent ( disability); some are positive
(dividends pay-outs), others negative (illness). The framework in Section 2 suggests that it is
important to distinguish between the e⁄ects of these various types of shocks because, according
to the theory, consumption should change almost one-for-one in response to permanent shocks
(positive or negative), but may react asymmetrically if shocks are transitory. Indeed, if households
are credit constrained (can save but not borrow) they will cut consumption strongly when hit by
a negative transitory shock, but will not react much to a positive one.
Recent papers in the quasi-experimental framework look at the e⁄ect of unemployment shocks
on consumption, and the smoothing bene￿ts provided by unemployment insurance (UI) schemes.
As pointed out by Browning and Crossley (2001) unemployment insurance provides two bene￿ts to
consumers. First, it provides ￿consumption smoothing bene￿ts￿for consumers that are liquidity
constrained. In the absence of credit constraints, individuals who faced a negative transitory
shock such as unemployment would borrow to smooth their consumption. If they are unable
to borrow they would need to adjust their consumption downward considerably. Unemployment
insurance provides some liquidity and hence it has positive welfare e⁄ects. Second, unemployment
insurance reduces the conditional variance of consumption growth and hence the need to accumulate
precautionary savings.
One of the earlier attempts to estimate the welfare e⁄ects of unemployment insurance is Gruber
56According to Friedman (1960), people were told more payments were coming, so the NSLI dividends were actually
a measure of permanent shocks to income, which would provide support for the PIH. He also noticed that the payments
were partly expected.
69(1997). Using the PSID, he constructs a sample of workers who loose their job between period t￿1
and period t, and regresses the change in food spending over the same time span against the UI
replacement rate an individual is eligible for (i.e., potential bene￿ts). Gruber ￿nds a large smoothing
e⁄ect of UI, in particular that a 10 percentage point rise in the replacement rate reduces the fall in
consumption upon unemployment by about 3 percent. He also ￿nds that the fall in consumption
at zero replacement rates is about 20 percent, suggesting that consumers face liquidity constraints.
Browning and Crossley (2001) extend Gruber￿ s idea to a di⁄erent country (Canada instead of
the US), using a more comprehensive measure of consumption (instead of just food) and legislated
changes in UI (instead of state-time variation). Moreover, their data are rich enough to allow
them to identify presumably liquidity constrained households (in particular, their data set provide
information on assets at the time of job loss). Browning and Crossley estimate a small elasticity
of expenditures with respect to UI bene￿t (5 percent). But this small e⁄ect masks substantial
heterogeneity, with low-assets households at time of job loss exhibiting elasticities as high as 20
percent. This is consistent with the presence of liquidity constraints.
A critique of this approach is that the response of consumption to unemployment shocks is
confounded by three sets of issues (similar arguments apply to papers that look at unpredictable
income changes due to illness or disability, as in Stephens, 2001). First, some of these shocks may not
come as a surprise, and individuals may have saved in their anticipation. For example, being laid o⁄
by Chrysler in 2009 should hardly come as a surprise. Ideally, one would overcome this problem by,
say, matching job accident data or ￿rm closure data with consumption data. Second, the theory
predicts that consumers smooth marginal utility, not consumption per se. If an unemployment
shock brings more leisure and if consumption is a substitute for leisure, an excess response of
consumption to the transitory shock induced by losing one￿ s job does not necessarily represent a
violation of the theory. Finally, even if unemployment shocks are truly fully unanticipated, they may
be partially insured through government programs such as unemployment insurance (and disability
insurance in case of disability shocks). An attenuated consumption response to a permanent income
shock due to disability may be explained by the availability of government-provided insurance,
rather than representing a failure of the theory. Therefore a complete analysis of the impact of
unemployment or disability shocks requires explicit modeling of the type of insurance available to
70individuals as well as of the possible interactions between public and private insurance.
The above discussion suggests that it might be easier to test the theory in contexts in which
insurance over and above self-insurance is not available, such as in developing countries. Gertler
and Gruber (2002) look at the e⁄ect of income shocks arising from major illness on consumption
in Indonesia. They ￿nd that while people smooth well the e⁄ect of minor illnesses (which could be
interpreted as transitory shocks, or anticipated events), they experience considerable more di¢ culty
in smoothing the impact of major illnesses (which could be interpreted as permanent shocks).
Wolpin (1982) and Paxson (1992) study the e⁄ect of weather shocks in India and Thailand,
respectively. In agricultural economies, weather shocks a⁄ect income directly through the pro-
duction function and deviations from normal weather conditions are truly unanticipated events.
Wolpin (1982) uses Indian regional time series data on rainfall to construct long run moments
as instruments for current income (which is assumed to measure permanent income with error).
The estimated permanent income elasticity ranges from 0.91 to 1.02 depending on the measure of
consumption, thus supporting strongly the permanent income model. Paxson (1992) uses regional
Thai data on weather to measure transitory shocks and ￿nds that Thai consumers have a high
propensity to save out of transitory weather shocks, in support of the theory. However, she also
￿nds that they have a propensity to save out of permanent shocks above zero, which rejects a strong
version of the permanent income hypothesis.
Studies using quasi-experimental variation to identify shocks to household income have the
obvious advantage that the identi￿cation strategy is clear and easy to explain and understand.
However, these studies￿obvious limitation is that they capture only one type of shocks at a time,
for instance illness, job loss, rainfall, extreme temperatures, or crop loss. One may wonder, for
example, whether the Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001) estimates obtained in a
sample of job losers have external validity for examining the e⁄ect of other types of shocks (especially
those that are much harder to insure, such as shocks to one￿ s productivity).
A second limitation of the approach is that some of the income shocks (in particular, unem-
ployment and disability shocks), cannot be considered as truly exogenous events. For instance, for
some people unemployment is a voluntary choice, and for others disability could be reported just
to obtain bene￿ts (a moral hazard issue). For this reason, not all income variability is necessarily
71unanticipated, or not acted upon by the agent (Low, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2009). The lesson of
the literature is that identifying episodes of genuine exogenous and unanticipated income changes
is very di¢ cult. One such case is weather conditions, to the extent at least to which people don￿ t
move to di⁄erent regions to o⁄set bad weather conditions.
4.4.3 Solution 2: Subjective expectations
As pointed out in Sections 4.1. and 4.2, identifying income shocks is di¢ cult because people may
have information that is not observed by the econometrician. For instance, they may know in
advance that they will face a temporary change in their income (such as a seasonal lay-o⁄). When
the news is realized, the econometrician will measure as a shock what is in fact an expected event.
The literature based on subjective expectations attempts to circumvent the problem by asking
people to report quantitative information on their expectations, an approach forcefully endorsed
by Manski (2004). This literature relies therefore on survey questions, rather than retrospective
data as in Section 4.2, to elicit information on the conditional distribution of future income, and
measures shocks as deviations of actual realizations from elicited expectations.
Hayashi (1985) is the ￿rst study to adopt this approach. He uses a four-quarter panel of
Japanese households containing respondents￿expectations about expenditure and income in the
following quarter. Hayashi works with disaggregate consumers￿expenditure, allowing each com-
ponent to have a di⁄erent degree of durability. He speci￿es a consumption rule, and allowing for
measurement error in expenditures, estimates the covariances between expected and unexpected
changes in consumption and expected and unexpected changes in income. His results are in line
with Hall and Mishkin (1982), suggesting a relatively high sensitivity of consumption to income
shocks.
Pistaferri (2001) combines income realizations and quantitative subjective income expectations
contained in the 1989-93 Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to identify sepa-
rately the transitory and the permanent income shocks. To see how subjective income expectations
allow estimating transitory and income shocks for each household, consider the income process of
equations (3) and (4). De￿ne E(xi;a;tj￿i;a￿1;t￿1) as the subjective expectation of xi;a;t given the
individual￿ s information set at age a ￿ 1. It is worth pointing out that ￿i;a￿1;t￿1 is the set of in-
72formation possessed at individual level; the econometrician￿ s information set is generally less rich.
The assumption of rational expectations implies that the transitory shock at time t can be point
identi￿ed by:
"i;a;t = ￿E (￿yi;a;tj￿i;a￿1;t￿1) (36)
Using equations (3), (4). and (36), the permanent shock at time t is identi￿ed by the expression:
￿i;a;t = ￿yi;a;t ￿ E (￿yi;a;tj￿i;a￿1;t￿1) + E (￿yi;a+1;t+1j￿i;a;t)
e.g., the income innovation at age a adjusted by a factor that takes into account the arrival of
new information concerning the change in income between a and a + 1. Thus, the transitory
and permanent shocks can be identi￿ed if one observes, for at least two consecutive time periods,
the conditional expectation and the realization of income, a requirement satis￿ed by the 1989-93
SHIW. Pistaferri estimates the saving for a rainy day equation of Campbell (1987) and ￿nds that
consumers save most of the transitory shocks and very little of the permanent shocks, supporting
the saving for a rainy day model.
Kaufmann and Pistaferri (2009) use the same Italian survey used by Pistaferri (2000), but
di⁄erent years (1995-2001) to distinguish the superior information issue from the insurance issue
mentioned in Section 4.2. Their empirical strategy is to consider the covariance restrictions implied
by the theory on the joint behavior of consumption, income realizations, and subjective quantitative
income expectations.
Their results are reproduced in Table 4.4.3. Their most general model separates transitory
changes in income in anticipated (with variance ￿2
"A), unanticipated (￿2
"U), and measurement error
(￿2
y); permanent changes in income in anticipated (￿2
￿A) and unanticipated (￿2
￿U); allows for mea-
surement error in consumption and subjective income expectations (￿2
c and ￿2
e, respectively), and
for partial insurance with respect to transitory shocks (￿) and permanent shocks (￿).
In column (1) they put themselves in the shoes of a researcher with access to just income data.
This researcher cannot separate anticipated from unanticipated changes in income or transitory
changes from measurement error, so assumes that measurement error is absent and all changes
are unforecastable, resulting in upward biased estimates of ￿2
￿U and ￿2
"U. In column (2) they
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add consumption data. The researcher is still unable to separate anticipate from unanticipated,
so any "superior information" is loaded into the insurance coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿. In particular,
the data provide evidence of some insurance with respect to permanent and transitory shocks.
Note that unlike what is predicted by the traditional version of the PIH, the transitory shock is
not fully insured, perhaps because of binding borrowing constraints (see Jappelli and Pistaferri,
2006). In column (3) one adds data on subjective income expectations and the model is now even
overidenti￿ed. A number of interesting facts emerge. First, the transitory variation in income
is split between anticipated component (about 50%), the unanticipated component (20%) and
measurement error (30%). This lowers the estimated degree of insurance with respect to transitory
shocks. Similarly, a good fraction of the permanent variation (about 1/3) appears anticipated, and
this now pushes the estimated insurance coe¢ cient towards 1 - i.e., these results show evidence
that there is no insurance whatsoever with respect to permanent shocks.
There are a few notes of caution to add to the comment of these results. First, the overidentifying
restrictions are rejected. Second, while the economic signi￿cance of the results is in accordance with
the idea that part of the estimated smoothing e⁄ects re￿ ect information, the standard errors are
high, preventing reliable inference.
74Subjective expectations: Data problems There is considerable promise in the use of sub-
jective expectations to evaluate the validity of various consumption models. However, it is fair to
say that studies that use subjective expectations are subject to various criticisms. In particular,
issues are raised about their reliability and informational content; moreover, it is still the case that
subjective expectations are seldom available alongside consumption and income data or con￿ned
to special survey modules. We are aware of only four data sets containing quantitative subjective
expectations of future income in developed countries: the Italian SHIW, the Dutch DHS, the Japan
SFC, and the US SEE.57 See Attanasio (2009) for a survey of quantitative subjective expectation
collection e⁄orts currently undergoing in developing countries.
The Italian SHIW o⁄ers the opportunity to test some simple hypotheses regarding the validity
of subjective data. In 1989 and 1991 people were asked to assign probability weights summing to
100 to various classes of income growth. In 1995 and 1998 they were asked to provide the minimum
and maximum expected income, plus the probability that their income was going to be below the
mid-point of the distribution. A ￿rst issue one may address is whether the wording of the subjective
expectation questions a⁄ects reliability. The response rates for 1989, 1991, 1995 and 1998 are 57%,
96%, 87%, and 94%, respectively. The big jump in response rates between 1989 and 1991 (and
somehow also between 1995 and 1998) may be due to interviewers being instructed to improve at
eliciting data rather than bearing any meaningful relation with the question format. The fact that
the SHIW has a panel component allows us to test for individual learning. The response rate in
1991 for people who were asked the same question format in the previous wave is 97% vs. 96%
for people with no previous experience (95% vs. 95% in 1998). Hence, there is no evidence that
having been asked the question before makes a di⁄erence in terms of response rates. Finally, we
compute the proportions of people who are "confused". In 1989-91 people were also asked more
qualitative questions, such as whether they were expecting their income to be "rather variable"
in the future. We de￿ne an individual to be "confused" if she reports income as being "rather
variable" but reports a degenerate distribution of expectations. For 1995-98, we assume that an
57Many surveys also contain qualitative subjective expectations (such as those used to construct the Consumer
Con￿dence index).
75individual is confused if she reports di⁄erent minimum and maximum expected incomes, but then
reports a probability of income below the midpoint of zero or 100%. Although the two de￿nitions
are not strictly comparable, it is interesting that the proportion of "confused" is higher in 1989-91
(17%) than in 1995-98 (11%), suggesting that people have more di¢ culty understanding the ￿rst
type of question (which is trying to elicit the individual p.d.f.) than the second type of question
(where the goal is to elicit the individual c.d.f).
5 Income processes, labour supply and mobility
The type of income processes discussed in Section 3 do not distinguish between ￿ uctuations in
income caused by exogenous shocks and those caused by endogenous responses to shocks. This is
particularly important when the income process is used to assess and simulate the amount of risk
faced by individuals.
For example in all the papers consider earlier labor supply is assumed exogenous; no attention
is paid to mobility across ￿rms; no attempt is made to understand whether a shock to productivity
comes from bad health, ￿rm re-organization, learning, changes in skill prices, etc.. In sum, there is
a black box approach in which the various sources of earnings ￿ uctuations are aggregated to form
a sort of ￿su¢ cient statistic￿(often due to data availability). However, one may want to analyze
the economic forces behind the degree of persistence and the amount of variability we observe in
earnings. One reason is that di⁄erent type of shocks may be di⁄erently insurable, raising important
policy implications. Moreover, it may allow us to better characterize behavior.
In a key contribution in this direction Abowd and Card (1989) extended the earlier literature
to consider joint movements of hours and wages. Having established that both hours and earnings
growth can be represented by an MA(2) process, they then link the two based on the lifecycle
model. Their approach can reveal how much of the variation in earnings comes from genuine
shocks to wages and how much is due to responses of these shocks through hours of work. Their
conclusion was that the common components in the variation of earnings and hours could not be
explained by variation in productivity. With their approach they opened up the idea of considering
the stochastic properties of di⁄erent related quantities jointly and to use this framework to assess
how much of the ￿ uctuations can be attributed to risk, as opposed to endogenous responses, such
76as changing hours. Of course, to the extent that hours may be driven by short term demand for
labour in the workplace, rather than voluntary adjustments, such ￿ uctuations may also represent
risk.
Extending the income process to allow for endogenous ￿ uctuations The key issue high-
lighted by the Abowd and Card approach is to disentangle the e⁄ect of shocks from the responses
to shocks. While Abowd and Card do not go all the way in that direction, they do relate the
￿ uctuations in earnings and hours.
Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2009) develop this direction by taking a much more structural
approach and modelling explicitly labour supply and job mobility in a search and matching frame-
work.58 This approach is not only explicit about distinguishing between shocks and responses to
shocks, but also distinguishes di⁄erent types of uncertainty, loosely associated with employment
risk and productivity risk.
The ￿rst important modi￿cation is that they are now explicit about modelling wages per unit
of time. In the speci￿c application the unit of time is a quarter and the individual may either be
working over this period or not. Extending the framework to a richer labour supply framework
(the intensive margin) is relatively straightforward. The second modi￿cation is allowing for match
e⁄ects; this implies that a source of ￿ uctuations is obtaining a di⁄erent job; what job one samples
is a separate source of risk, to the extent that match e⁄ects are important. However, individuals
can accept or reject job o⁄ers, a fact that needs to be recognized when combining such a process
with a model of lifecycle consumption and labour supply.
In what follows we use the notation w for (hourly) wages. Hence we specify
lnwi;a;t = dt + x0
i;a;t  + ui;a;t + ei;a;t + aij(t0) (37)
where wi;a;t is the real hourly wage, dt represents the log price of human capital at time t, xi;a;t a
vector of regressors including age, ui;a;t the permanent component of wages, and ei;a;t the transitory
error component. All parameters of the wage process are education speci￿c (subscripts omitted for
simplicity).
58Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2007) show that it is possible to derive a linear latent factor structure for
log wages, hours, and consumption in a rich framework with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets under
some assumptions.
77In principle, the term ei;a;t might be thought of as representing a mix between a transitory
shock and measurement error. In the usual decomposition of shocks into transitory and permanent
components, researchers work with annual earnings data where transitory shocks may well be
important because of unemployment spells. In this framework, what is probably the most important
source of transitory shocks is modeled explicitly through the employment and job mobility.
The term aij(t0) denotes a ￿rm-worker match-speci￿c component where j (t0) indexes the ￿rm
that the worker joined in period t0 ￿ t.59 It is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero
and variance ￿2
a: Low, Meghir and Pistaferri model the match e⁄ect as constant over the life of
the worker-employer relationship. If the worker switches to a di⁄erent employer between t and
t + 1, however, there will be some resulting wage growth which we can term a mobility premium
denoted as ￿i;a+1;t+1 = aij(t+1) ￿ aij(t0). The match e⁄ect is assumed normally distributed and
successive draws of aij(t) are assumed independent; however, because of the endogenous mobility
decisions successive realizations of the match e⁄ect will be correlated. Since o⁄ers can be rejected
when received, only a censored distribution of ￿i;a+1;t+1 is observed. The match e⁄ect aij(:) is
complementary to individual productivity.60 Both the match e⁄ect and the idiosyncratic shock can
have education-speci￿c distributions. To keep things relatively simple, suppose the information
structure is such that workers and ￿rms are completely informed about ui;a;t and aij(:) when they
meet (jobs are ￿search goods￿ ).61
Assume that the permanent component of wages follows a random walk process:
ui;a;t = ui;a￿1;t￿1 + ￿i;a;t (38)
The random shock to the permanent process, ￿i;a;t is normally distributed with mean zero and
variance ￿2
￿ and is independent over time. Assume this shock re￿ ects uncertainty.62
59We should formally have a j subscript on wages but since it does not add clarity we have dropped it. Note also
that in the absence of ￿rm data one cannot distinguish between a pure ￿rm e⁄ect and a pure match e⁄ect. In the
latter case, one can imagine ￿ij(t0) as being the part of the matching rent that accrues to the worker. Low, Meghir
and Pistaferri take the bargaining process that produces this sharing outcome as given.
60Ideally one would like to allow also for shocks to the match e⁄ect. These will act as within-￿rm aggregate shocks.
Restricting match e⁄ects to be constant is forced the lack of matched ￿rm and individual data.
61The importance of match e⁄ects in explaining wages has been stressed by Topel and Ward (1992) and Kramaz and
Margolis (1999). Postel Vinay and Robin (2002) show in an equilibrium setting how ￿rm and individual heterogeneity
translate into a match e⁄ect.
62As discussed in earlier sections, an important issue is how much of the period-to-period variability of wages
re￿ ects uncertainty. A large component of this variability is measurement error, which here is controlled for.
78Given a particular level of unobserved productivity, the worker will be willing to work for some
￿rms but not for others, depending on the value of the match. The measurement error ei;a;t is
normally distributed with variance ￿2
e and independent over time. As far as the policy implications
of the model are concerned, we are interested in estimating ￿2
a and ￿2
￿. We describe later how these
are estimated.
In order to make sense of such a process, we need to make further assumptions relating to ￿rm
behavior. Thus it is simpler to assume that there are constant returns to scale in labor implying
that the ￿rm is willing to hire anyone who can produce non-negative rents. In this context, receiving
an outside o⁄er is akin to a wage shock; however, a worker need not accept such an outside o⁄er.
This means that some wage rises, that are due to such o⁄ers are attributed to pure risk. In practice
they are the result of a shock and a response to that shock. However, we assume the ￿rm does not
respond to outside o⁄ers.63
The above structure describes both the sources of shocks and the reactions to them. First,
we have the shocks to productivity ￿i;a;t; second, there are shocks to job opportunities: these are
re￿ ected in the job arrival rate when employed (￿e) and when unemployed (￿n), as well as by the
possibility of a lay o⁄ (job destruction, ￿). Finally, there is the draw of a match speci￿c e⁄ect.
Individuals can respond to these by quitting into unemployment and accepting or rejecting a job
o⁄er. This model clari￿es what aspect of earnings ￿ uctuations re￿ ects risk and what re￿ ects an
endogenous reaction to risk. The discussion also highlights the distinction between just describing
the ￿ uctuations of income vis-￿-vis estimating a model of income ￿ uctuations whose intention is to
understand the welfare implications of risk.
Estimating the model Once we recognize that earnings ￿ uctuations are also due to endoge-
nous reactions to shocks, we need to take this into account in estimation in an internally consistent
way. In the LMP model the two ways that individuals can react is by deciding whether to work
or not and deciding whether to accept alternative job o⁄ers. These decisions are a function of the
o⁄ers received by the worker, which means that the distribution of wages is truncated both by the
63The fact that returns to tenure tend to be very low is evidence that responses to outside o⁄ers are not of ￿rst
order importance in understanding wage ￿ uctuations. Altonji and Williams (2005) assess this literature and conclude
that their preferred estimate for the US is a return to tenure of 1.1 percent a year.
79decision to work or not and by the decision to move ￿rms. Thus estimating the components of risk
involves correcting for selection both into work and for job mobility.
The e⁄ect of the modi￿cations that LMP allow for relative to the standard approach, and in
particular that of accounting for the e⁄ect of job mobility, is to reduce substantially the estimated
variance of permanent shocks from the one reported in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). However, this
does not necessarily mean that overall uncertainty declined: these modi￿cations have changed the
balance between permanent and transitory factors and have allowed for a better understanding of
the sources of uncertainty and its welfare implications. Job destruction for example is a transitory,
albeit persistent shock, because after a while it is expected that the individual will obtain a job
and climb again the ladder of job quality. Persistence will be governed by the rate of arrival of
job o⁄ers. On the other hand shocks to wages are literally permanent because of the random walk
structure. The authors show that data simulated from the model can indeed replicate very well the
earnings dynamics estimated with the less structural approaches in the literature. The di⁄erences
in modelling are however very important because they have implications for consumption, savings
and welfare.
The second recent paper along the lines of understanding the sources of shocks is that of Altonji,
Viidangos and Smith (2009). They estimate a complex stochastic model of wages, hours of work,
transitions between employment and unemployment, and between jobs. Each of these events is
governed by a reduced form model depending on exogenous characteristics, endogenous states and
on exogenous shocks, which are the underlying source of ￿ uctuations. Importantly, the model
allows for selection into work and because of transitions between jobs. The stochastic process
of wages includes a match speci￿c e⁄ect, an individual ￿xed e⁄ect and an AR(1) process; this
is estimated to be 0.92 in various speci￿cations, which is short of a random walk. Persistence is
further reinforced by an AR(1) transitory shock and a further independent shock to earnings, which
follows an AR component, with estimated coe¢ cient of about 0.55. The lack of a random walk and
the overall structure of the model does mean that the ￿t of the standard deviation of log earnings
is not very good. In particular, the model predicts a ￿ atter lifecycle pro￿le in the cross sectional
variance of log-earnings than the data. Nevertheless, both these papers make it clear that in order
to understand uncertainty and its impact we need to account for the origin of the shocks. This
80should help further in identifying the nature of uncertainty and the persistence of shocks.
Other Approaches on Endogenizing Volatility Here we discuss other approaches endoge-
nizing wage or earnings volatility.
Postel-Vinay and Turon (2009) test whether the observed covariance structure of earnings in
the UK may be generated by a structural job search model with on-the-job search. Individuals
who are currently unemployed can move back into employment conditioning on receiving an o⁄er
and ￿nd this o⁄er acceptable; people with jobs can stay with their current employer (if job is
not destroyed), move to another ￿rm (conditioning on receiving an outside o⁄er) or move into
unemployment. In each period, o⁄ered wages are subject to i.i.d. productivity shocks ". These
may induce renegotiations (by mutual consent) of the bargained wage, resulting occasionally in wage
cuts or wage raises. However, mutual consent means that there are cases in which productivity
shocks are insu¢ cient to generate wage changes, and so wages are ￿xed at previous period￿ s level.
This is the primary source of persistence observed in the data - an analyst may ￿nd evidence of a
random walk in earnings even though the underlying productivity shock to wages is a pure i.i.d..
Low and Pistaferri (2010) use data on subjective reports of work limitations available from the
PSID to identify health shocks separately from other shocks to productivity. Their framework is
similar to LMP. It is simpler in certain dimensions (there are no ￿rm speci￿c e⁄ects and hence
no job-to-job decisions), but richer in others (the modeling of health risk, the disability insurance
institutional framework and the behavior of the social security system in the screening process).
They use their model to assess quantitatively how much screening errors are made, and to examine
the welfare consequences of changes in the feature of the disability insurance program that try
to change the insurance-incentive trade-o⁄, such as increasing the strictness of the screening test,
reducing bene￿ts, or increasing the probability of re-assessment.
Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2007) study human capital accumulation. In their model individ-
uals may choose to divert some of their working time to the production of human capital. People
di⁄er in initial human capital (schooling, parents￿teachings, etc.), initial ￿nancial wealth, and the
innate ability to learn. Among other things, their framework generalizes Ben-Porath (1967) to
allow for risk, i.e., shocks to the existing stock of human capital. Their questions of interest are:
81(a) How much of lifetime inequality is determined before entry in the labor market (initial condi-
tions)? and (b) How much is due to episodes of good or bad luck over the life cycle (shocks)? The
answers to these two questions have clear policy relevance. If the answer to (a) is ￿a lot￿ , one would
want early intervention policies (e.g., public education). If the answer to (b) is ￿a lot￿ , one would
want to expand income maintenance programs (UI, means-tested welfare, etc.). In HVY wages
grow because of shocks to existing human capital, or systematic fanning out due to di⁄erences in
learning abilities. Old people do not invest, hence only the ￿rst force is present. This provides
an important idea for identi￿cation: Data on old workers can be used to identify the distribution
of shocks to human capital. They next construct an age pro￿le for the ￿rst, second, and third
moment of earnings. Age, time, cohort e⁄ects are not separately identi￿able, so need to impose
some restrictions, such as: (a) No time e⁄ects (b) No cohort e⁄ects. Finally, they calibrate the
distribution of initial conditions (initial human capital and learning ability) and the shape of the
human capital production function to match the age pro￿le of the ￿rst three moments of earn-
ings, while ￿xing the remaining parameters to realistic values (from the literature). HVY use their
model to do two things: (1) compute how much lifetime inequality is due to initial conditions and
how much to shocks, and (2) run counterfactual experiments (shutting down risk to human capital
or learning ability di⁄erences). Their results are that between 60% and 70% of the variability in
lifetime utility (or earnings) is due to variability in initial conditions. Among initial conditions,
the lion￿ s share is taken by heterogeneity in initial human capital (rather than initial wealth or
innate ability). Eliminating learning ability heterogeneity makes the age pro￿le of inequality ￿ at
(even declining over a good fraction of the working life, 35-55). Eliminating shocks to human
capital generates a more moderate U-shape age pro￿le of inequality. For our purposes, one of the
main points of the paper is that the standard incomplete markets model (for example, Heathcote,
Storesletten and Violante, 2008) ￿which assumes an exogenous income process ￿may exaggerate
the weight played by shocks as opposed to initial conditions in determining lifetime inequality.
Hence, it may overestimate the welfare gain of government insurance programs and underestimate
the welfare gain of providing insurance against ￿bad initial conditions￿(bad schools, bad parents,
bad friends, etc.). Note however that the ￿exaggeration￿e⁄ect of IM models only holds under the
assumption that initial conditions are fully known to the agents at the beginning of the life cycle.
82If people have to ￿learn￿their initial conditions, then they will face unpredictable innovations to
these processes. Recent work by Guvenen (2007) estimates that people can forecast only about
60% of their ￿learning ability￿￿the remaining 40% is uncertainty revealed (quite slowly) over the
life cycle. Similar conclusions are reached in work by Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005).
Shocks and labour market equilibrium We have moved from the standard reduced form
models of income ￿ uctuations to the more structural approach of Low, Meghir and Pistaferri
(2010). However, there is further to go. What is missing from this framework is an explicit
treatment of equilibrium pay policies. More speci￿cally, in LMP the wage shocks are speci￿ed as
shocks to the match speci￿c e⁄ect, without specifying how these shocks arise. If we think about
the match speci￿c e⁄ect as being produced by a combination of the qualities of the worker and
of the ￿rm, then as in Postel-Vinay and Robin(2002), we can work out the pay policy of the ￿rm
under di⁄erent assumptions on the strategies that individuals and ￿rms follow. In that framework
income/earnings , but only because individuals either receive alternative job o⁄ers, to which the
incumbent ￿rm responds, or because they move to an alternative ￿rm.
Lise, Meghir and Robin (2009) generalize this framework to allow for shocks to the ￿rm￿ s
productivity. In this context, the observed wage shocks are further decomposed as originating from
shocks to the productivity of the ￿rm, responses to alternative o⁄ers or to moving to new jobs,
either via unemployment or directly by ￿rm to ￿rm transition. In this context, the shocks are
speci￿ed as changes in basic underlying characteristics of the ￿rm as well as due to search frictions
and comes closest to providing a full structural interpretation of income shocks, allowing also for the
behavior of ￿rms and strategies that lead to wages not being always responsive to the underlying
shocks.64 While this o⁄ers a way forward in understanding the source of ￿ uctuations, the approach
is not complete because it assumes that both individuals and ￿rms are risk neutral. In this sense
individuals have no interest in insurance and do not save for precautionary reasons. Extending such
models to allow for risk aversion, wage contracts that partially insure the worker and for savings, is
the natural direction for obtaining an integrated approach of earnings ￿ uctuations and an analysis
64See Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005) for a more reduced form approach decomposing wage shocks onto a
component related to (transitory and permanent) ￿rm shocks, and one related to idiosyncratic shocks (inclduing
measurement error).
83of the e⁄ects of risk.65
To provide an idea of how these more structural approaches work, we give a brief overview of
the Lise, Meghir and Robin (2009) model. Individuals are characterized by a type denoted by say x:
These are individual characteristics that are possibly observed or unobserved. The key restriction
here is that all characteristics contribute to one productivity index. Individual utility is the income
they receive from work, as in a standard search model. This linearity is technically very important
but as said above it precludes any consideration of risk aversion. A key ingredient in the LMR
paper is that ￿rms or jobs employ one worker in a particular position, which is an extreme form of
decreasing returns to scale and leads to an option value of waiting for a good worker under certain
circumstances. The job is also characterized by a type y; this can be thought of as representing prior
investments in technology and market conditions. However, this productivity level is subject to
shocks, which can be conceived of as product market shocks. A key ingredient of the model is that
the individual characteristics and the ￿rm type may be complementary, in such a way that total
output in the economy can be increased by allocating good worker types to high productivity ￿rms
and lower worker types to lower productivity ones, very much like in a Becker marriage market.
At the heart of the model is pay determination in response to the quality of the worker and the
￿rm, and in response to outside o⁄ers that result from on-the-job search. Very much like LMP there
are the following shocks embedded in the model: random changes in productivity y; individuals
receiving an outside o⁄er from an alternative job; the job may be exogenously destroyed. However,
the important di⁄erence is that LMR derive the impact of these shocks to both employment and
wages explicitly accounting for the incentive structure both from the side of the worker and the
￿rm making persistence endogenous. Speci￿cally, when the productivity of the ￿rm changes this
translates to a wage change only if the relationship remains pro￿table and one of the two partners
can make a credible threat to leave the partnership; if the relationship ceases to be feasible there
is separation and if there is no common agreement to renegotiate, wages remain at their previous
level. The model leads to a number of interesting implications about the stochastic evolution of
wages and about pay policy: wages are smoother than productivity; the e⁄ect of worker and ￿rm
heterogeneity cannot be decomposed in a log-linear fashion as in Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis
65Lise, Meghir and Robin (2010) are working in this direction.
84(2000); wages grow with time, due to on the job search. It is possible that the combination of the
relatively smoothed may policy within the ￿rm and the nature of job mobility combine to give a
time series process of wages that looks like a random walk as discussed by Postel-Vinay and Turon
(2006): In their model the combination of iid shocks and wage renegotiations in an environment
with search frictions leads to wages with a unit root. Interestingly they also show that the implied
variance of the shocks can have an ARCH structure, as identi￿ed by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
6 Conclusions
We started this chapter discussing the importance of measuring and understanding labor market
risks. In particular, what￿ s the impact of risk on behavior? What types of risks matter? Answering
these questions has proved to be quite di¢ cult. One banal problem that hinders analysis is that
for the countries most studied in the literature, the US and the UK, long panel data with regular
observations on consumption, income and wealth are not available. Moreover, in most cases data
are of debatable quality. Take the issue of answering the question whether the rise in inequality is
due to phenomena like skill-biased technical change or wage instability. One proposal (as argued
in Blundell and Preston, 1998) is to study consumption inequality. The papers that have done so
include Cutler and Katz (1992), Dynarski and Gruber (1997), Krueger and Perri (2006), Blundell,
Pistaferri and Preston (2008), and Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2004). Most papers ￿nd that
consumption inequality rises less than income inequality. In the US the di⁄erence is substantial,
and some papers go so far as to claim that consumption inequality has not changed at all (Krueger
and Perri). Given that all these analyses use the CEX, and given that the CEX su⁄ers from severe
problems of detachment from National Accounts, it is worth wondering whether this evidence is
spurious and due to data problems.66 Some recent papers (Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura, 2004;
Battistin and Padula, 2010), have combined Diary and Interview CEX data in an ingenious way
to revise upward the estimates of the trends in consumption inequality. Nevertheless, the ￿nding
that consumption inequality rises less rapidly than income inequality is con￿rmed.
We have discussed how empirical researchers have come up with ingenious ways of remedying
data di¢ culties. A separate problem is that identi￿cation of the "correct" income process from
66However, a recent special issue of the Review of Economic Dynamics (2010) has con￿rmed that for many other
countries (in which data are better) consumption inequality also rises less than income inequality.
85income data is not straightforward. Yet, it is key for interpreting and predicting consumption
responses. For example, the theory predicts that consumption responds strongly to permanent
shocks and very little to transitory shocks. But we do not observe these components separately, so
we have to come up with methods (typically, statistical methods) to extract them from observed
income data. These methods may su⁄er from bias or statistical power problems. Furthermore, even
if repeated observations of income realizations were able to provide information on the "correct"
income process (in terms of its persistence, number of components, etc.), it would still not solve the
problem of how much of the measured variability is anticipated and how much is unanticipated by
the consumer, which is another key distinction for predicting consumption responses to changes in
income. As said earlier, the theory predicts that consumption responds to unanticipated changes
but not to anticipated ones (unless there are liquidity constraints). In the literature, authors have
suggested that some of these problems can be solved by the joint use of consumption and income
data (or labor supply and income data). While this is an important development, it does not
necessarily solve the problem. There is a third distinction (besides "permanent vs. transitory"
and "anticipated vs. unanticipated") that is necessary to understand how consumption reacts
to shocks, and it￿ s the distinction between "insurable" and "uninsurable" (or partially insurable)
shocks, which requires taking some stand on such complicated issues as structure of credit and
insurance markets, other decisions margins within the household (labor supply, family networks,
etc.), as well as the modeling of government transfers (which may sometimes displace private
transfers and self-insurance). This is an identi￿cation problem that has so far found only partial
and unsatisfactory solutions.
Finally, on the data front one has to point out that large progress has been achieved through
the use of administrative data available now in many countries. This of course does not solve
the problems with consumption data, but it does allow us to understand potentially much better
the dynamic of income and of wage determination. Much can be achieved by further theoretical
developments and the systematic collection of excellent data.
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